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THE STREAM OF VIOLENCE: A NEW APPROACH TO 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
 
Cody J. Jacobs
*
 
 
Abstract 
 
There is a split among state courts about whether personal 
jurisdiction over an alleged domestic violence perpetrator is required 
in order to obtain a civil protection order preventing the defendant 
from contacting the victim.  Some courts have held that such orders 
interfere with the defendant’s liberty interests, and therefore personal 
jurisdiction is a requirement under the Due Process Clause for the 
validity of such orders.  Other courts have held that personal 
jurisdiction is not required because such protection orders are 
analogous to custody and divorce orders which have historically been 
entered by courts without establishing personal jurisdiction over the 
other party under the “status exception.”  This Article argues that the 
focus on the status exception is misplaced and that instead, courts 
should reframe the way they look at personal jurisdiction in domestic 
violence cases by applying the principals embedded in the stream of 
commerce doctrine and the effects test.  Drawing upon common 
threads from each line of cases, the Article proposes a test for 
domestic violence jurisdiction that focuses on the knowledge of the 
defendant about the victim’s likely destination if she is forced to flee 
to another state.    
  
                                                 
*
 Abraham L. Freedman Fellow, Temple University James E. Beasley School of Law.   
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2754088 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Alan Burnett had a history of making violent threats against his wife.  He 
repeatedly told Caren Burnett throughout their seven year marriage that if 
she ever left him, he would kill her and “go to jail” leaving their three 
children to live with his parents.  At one point, he even described a 
gruesome plan to kill her and hide the evidence using a wood chipper.  
Caren finally decided she had enough and fled from her husband in Florida 
to her father’s house in Sandusky County, Ohio.  Upon arriving in Ohio, she 
promptly filed a motion for a domestic violence civil protection order and 
presented evidence of Alan’s serious threats and the fact that he “knew all 
the places she would go” to flee from him.  The trial court entered an order 
of protection, but the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed, finding that the 
trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Alan, leaving Caren with an 
impossible choice: either risk her own safety by traveling to Florida to seek 
an order of protection or wait for Alan to come to Ohio and threaten her and 
her children sufficiently to give rise to jurisdiction in Ohio. 
 
This Article argues that people like Caren should not be forced into such a 
difficult decision.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
does protect out of state residents from being subject to personal jurisdiction 
in states with which they have no connection, but when a person engages in 
conduct that they know or should know is likely to have an impact in 
another state, courts have shown a willingness in other contexts to allow the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction in those states.  Manufacturers may be 
subject to jurisdiction when they place a product into the stream of 
commerce that they know or should know will end up in a particular forum 
even if the manufacturer never sold products directly to a buyer in that 
forum.  Intentional tortfeasors may be subject to personal jurisdiction when 
they engage in tortious conduct that they know will have an effect in 
another forum, even if the tortfeasor never set foot in that forum.   
 
When a person like Alan Burnett engages in a pattern of threatening 
conduct toward a person he knows will be likely to seek refuge in a 
particular place—the place he knows her family lives—he should likewise 
be subject to personal jurisdiction in that place.  This Article argues that 
courts should reframe the personal jurisdiction inquiry in the context of 
domestic violence in the same way they have framed that inquiry in these 
other contexts: by holding the defendant responsible for the knowledge he 
possesses about the likely results of his actions.  This approach is a more 
coherent one than the “status” approach, which has been at the center of this 
debate in lower courts and which seeks to exempt domestic violence 
4 The Stream of Violence 10-Feb-16 
restraining orders from personal jurisdiction requirements altogether by 
analogizing those orders to divorce and custody actions. 
 
Part II.A will describe the historical context in which the status exception 
arose and its current justifications.  Part II.B will examine the debate in the 
courts over whether the status exception should apply to domestic violence 
cases.
1
  Part III will explain why the status exception is not an appropriate 
vehicle for dealing with interstate domestic violence cases.  Part IV will 
describe the development of the stream of commerce doctrine and the 
effects test and draw common threads from those lines of cases that are 
applicable to the domestic violence context. Part V will weave those 
common threads into a “Knowledge Test” for domestic violence cases that 
asks whether the defendant was aware the victim was likely to flee to the 
forum.  Part VI will address potential objections to the Knowledge Test.      
 
II.  PERSONAL JURISDICTION & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESTRAINING ORDERS 
 
In most civil actions, it is a prerequisite to entering a judgment against a 
defendant that the court have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
2
    
Personal jurisdiction can be acquired by in-state service on a defendant 
voluntarily present in the state,
3
 with the defendant’s consent, 4 or by 
establishing that the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum such 
that haling the defendant into court there is consistent with traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.
5
  
 
However, there has long been an exception to these requirements for cases 
that concern a determination of the plaintiff’s “status.”  This status 
                                                 
1
 This article uses the phrase “domestic violence cases” to refer to civil proceedings by 
plaintiffs seeking domestic violence restraining orders, not criminal cases where the 
defendant is charged with a domestic violence related offense.  
2
 See, e.g., 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 68 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is the power of a 
tribunal to subject and bind a particular person or entity to its decisions.”). 
3
 See Burnham v. Superior Court of California, Cty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 616-19 
(1990) (opinion of Scalia, J.); id. at 628-29 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Cody Jacobs, If 
Corporations Are People, Why Can’t They Play Tag?, 46 N.M. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 12, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2560553). 
4
 See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
703 (1982) (“Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an 
individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived. . . . A variety of legal 
arrangements have been taken to represent express or implied consent to the personal 
jurisdiction of the court.”). 
5
 See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & 
Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).  
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exception allows a court to determine the legal status of a person properly 
before the court, even if that status has an impact on another person over 
whom the court may not be able to obtain personal jurisdiction.
6
  Courts 
have relied upon this exception to grant divorces even in situations where 
the court has jurisdiction over only one of the spouses.
7
 Similarly, courts 
have entered child custody orders when the children at issue reside in a 
forum even when the court lacks jurisdiction over one of the parents.
8
 
 
There is a split in the lower courts over whether the status exception applies 
to actions seeking domestic violence restraining orders against out of state 
defendants.
9
  Some courts hold that such orders do not fall into the status 
exception at all and that, therefore, in the absence of personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant, no restraining order may be issued.
10
 Other courts hold 
that the exception does apply to such orders because they merely concern 
the protected “status” of the person seeking the order.11   However, many of 
the courts that have found the status exception applicable to domestic 
violence restraining orders have held that due process requires some serious 
limitations on the scope of such orders when the court lacks personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.
12
 
       
A.  The Status Exception 
 
Although a version of the status exception was already followed by state 
courts at the time,
13
 the exception was fully entrenched in jurisdictional 
jurisprudence by dicta in the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennoyer v. 
Neff.
14
 In that case, the Court declared for the first time that the recently 
ratified Fourteenth Amendment placed constitutional limits on state courts’ 
                                                 
6
 See Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 813, 815-16 & n.10 (1995). 
7
 Id. at 815-18. 
8
 Id. 
9
 Some courts style the person seeking a restraining order as the “petitioner” and the 
person against whom the order is sought as the “respondent,” while others refer to the 
parties simply as the plaintiff and defendant respectively.  For clarity, this article adopts the 
latter nomenclature throughout. 
10
 See, e.g., Fox v. Fox, 106 A.3d 919, 926-27 (Vt. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 952 
(2015); Becker v. Johnson, 937 So. 2d 1128, 1130-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); T.L. v. 
W.L., 820 A.2d 506, 512-15 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003). 
11
 See, e.g., Hemenway v. Hemenway, 992 A.2d 575, 581-82 (N.H. 2010); Caplan v. 
Donovan, 879 N.E.2d 117, 122-25 (Mass. 2008); Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 10 
(Iowa 2001).  
12
 See Part II.B.1, infra.   
13
 Wasserman, supra note 6, at 824 
14
 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
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exercise of personal jurisdiction.  The Court held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause prevented state courts from exercising 
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants unless the defendant 
made a voluntary appearance in court or was served with process while 
physically present in the state.
15
  However, the Court described an important 
limitation on its holding:   
 
To prevent any misapplication of the views 
expressed in this opinion, it is proper to 
observe that we do not mean to assert, by any 
thing we have said, that a State may not 
authorize proceedings to determine the status 
of one of its citizens towards a non-resident, 
which would be binding within the State, 
though made without service of process or 
personal notice to the non-resident. The 
jurisdiction which every State possesses to 
determine the civil status and capacities of all 
its inhabitants involves authority to prescribe 
the conditions on which proceedings affecting 
them may be commenced and carried on 
within its territory.
16
 
 
Thus, the Court carved out a special exception for cases involving the status 
of the plaintiff as opposed to the personal rights of the defendant.  In those 
cases, the Court found no due process problem with state courts 
determining the status of in-state plaintiffs even where the adjudication of 
that status would have a clear impact on the defendant. 
 
The status exception has been widely accepted by courts as a means of 
conducting what scholars call “ex parte divorce” actions—divorces where 
the state lacks personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant 
spouse.
17
  The status exception has also been used to justify the adjudication 
of child custody disputes where the child is physically present in the forum 
                                                 
15
 Id. at 733.  As discussed in Part IV, infra, these traditional bases of jurisdiction have 
since been augmented by the minimum contacts framework.  See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 
316. 
16
 Id. at 734 (emphasis in original). 
17
 See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 816 n.13 (noting that the phrase “ex parte divorce” 
is something of a misnomer because—at least in modern times—courts do require notice to 
the defendant in such cases even if they do not have personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant). 
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state but the forum lacks personal jurisdiction over one of the parents.
18
 In 
order to understand why courts disagree about whether this exception 
applies to domestic violence cases, it is first necessary to understand why it 
does apply in these contexts and to examine the limitations courts have 
placed on its application. 
 
1. Divorce & Child Custody 
 
The application of the status exception to divorces rose to prominence 
during the nineteenth century—a time when society and the law took a very 
different view of marriage than today.  Once a man and woman were 
married, they essentially became a single unit in the eyes of the law, but it 
was the husband who had almost all of the power to control this marital 
unit.
19
 The husband became the sole owner of all of his wife’s property 
upon marriage, and was entitled to all wages, bequests, and gifts the wife 
received during marriage.
20
  A married woman had no right to make 
contracts and—at least in some states—no right to work at all without the 
permission of her husband.
21
  At the same time, the number of divorces was 
rising dramatically
22
 and the most common ground
23
 for divorce was 
desertion or abandonment.
24
 
 
A woman who found herself abandoned by her husband was left in a 
precarious situation if the husband fled to another state.  She would be 
unable to support herself financially because of patriarchal marital laws, but 
also unable to obtain a divorce from her absent husband because of the 
territorial view of personal jurisdiction that prevailed at that time.  This 
concern at least partially motivated the Pennoyer court’s entrenchment of 
the status exception for divorces.
25
    
 
In the child custody context, many courts historically held that personal 
                                                 
18
 See id. at 816-18. 
19
 See id. at 824-25 (“[I]n the eyes of the law the husband and wife were one person —
the husband.”) (quoting NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE 
AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK 42 (1982)). 
20
 See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 824-25. 
21
 See id. at 825-26. 
22
 See id. at 828 & n.73. 
23
 The first “no fault” divorce law did not go into effect until over a century after 
Pennoyer.  See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 
1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 83 (1991). 
24
 See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 830; Neal R. Feigenson, Extraterritorial 
Recognition of Divorce Decrees in the Nineteenth Century, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 
123 (1990). 
25
 See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 832. 
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jurisdiction over both parents was not required where the child was subject 
to personal jurisdiction in the forum.
26
  However, courts were divided about 
the rationale for doing so.  Some relied on the “status” rationale while 
others relied on a “physical presence” rationale that analogized the child to 
property.
27
   Still other courts held that personal jurisdiction over both 
parents was in fact required in child custody cases.
28
      
 
The confusion among courts on this point was clarified
29
 by the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”), which was enacted by all 50 
states by 1981.
30
  The UCCJA adopted the view that the status exception 
applied to child custody determinations, making the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over both parents unnecessary for a court to render a custody 
judgment.
31
  Although some commentators have questioned the UCCJA’s 
                                                 
26
 See Barbara Ann Atwood, Child Custody Jurisdiction and Territoriality, 52 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 369, 378 (1991). 
27
 Wasserman, supra note 6, at 867-68; Atwood, supra note 26, at 377-78. 
28
 Wasserman, supra note 6, at 863-64; Atwood, supra note 26, at 377.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) appeared to adopt this position 
when a five Justice majority held that Ohio courts did not have to recognize a custody 
judgment entered by a Wisconsin court awarding sole custody of three children to their 
father when the Wisconsin court lacked personal jurisdiction over the mother.  Id. at 528-
29.  However, in a concurring opinion Justice Frankfurter stated that he was joining the 
Court’s opinion with the understanding that the Court’s only holding was that the Full Faith 
and Credit clause did not require Ohio to recognize Wisconsin’s judgment, but that nothing 
(presumably including the Due Process Clause) prevented Ohio from choosing to recognize 
that judgment if it had wanted to do so.  Id. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  While 
some courts read May expansively as precluding child custody judgments without 
jurisdiction over both parents, others followed Justice Frankfurter’s interpretation, while 
still others ignored May altogether.  See David J. Benson, Can A Case Be Made for the Use 
of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in Child Support Determinations?, 26 
GONZ. L. REV. 125, 132 (1991); Atwood, supra note 26, at 370.  Thus, May ultimately 
failed to provide much clarity on this issue.  See, e.g., Benson, supra note 28, at 132; see 
also In re Marriage of Leonard, 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 452 (1981). (noting that May “has 
been of relatively slight importance” in the evolution of child custody jurisdiction 
jurisprudence).    
29
 Atwood, supra note 26, at 403 n.4 (“One cannot deny that the jurisdictional 
landscape is much more ordered today than in pre-UCCJA times.”); but see Christopher L. 
Blakesley, Child Custody-Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY L.J. 291, 361-62 (1986) 
(noting that even after the UCCJA, “problems still remain” and “many questions must still 
be answered before one may assess the effectuality of the legislative scheme to resolve the 
problems of child custody jurisdiction.”). 
30
 See BALDWIN’S OH. PRAC. DOM. REL. L., § 17:23 History of the UCCJEA (4th ed.). 
31
 See Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act § 12 cmt. (amended 1999), 9-1 U.L.A. at 
274 (“There is no requirement for technical personal jurisdiction, on the traditional theory 
that custody determinations . . . are proceedings in rem or proceedings affecting status.”); 
see also Atwood, supra note 26, at 378-79 (“Many modern courts, relying on assertions in 
the commentary to the UCCJA, have likewise embraced the status doctrine, reasoning that 
10-Feb-16 The Stream of Violence 9 
constitutionality on this point,
32
 modern courts have largely upheld the 
application of the status exception to custody determinations.
33
   
 
2. Justification & Limitations 
 
The status exception is primarily justified by the sovereignty a state 
possesses over persons within its borders.  As the Supreme Court argued in 
the early twentieth century, it would improperly abrogate that sovereignty if 
a state were “deprived, directly or indirectly, of its sovereign power to 
regulate the status of its own domiciled subjects and citizens, by the fact 
that the subjects and citizens of other states, as related to them, are 
interested in that status.”34  The basic idea is that states have a special 
interest in making sure that the status of its residents with respect to 
important matters such as child custody and divorce is not left unclear.
35
  A 
related justification that has been commonly offered for the status exception 
is a practical one:  if personal jurisdiction were required to obtain a divorce 
or make a child custody determination, it may be very difficult or 
impractical for such cases to be litigated at all in cases where no forum has 
                                                                                                                            
personal jurisdiction is unnecessary because child custody determinations are 
determinations of a child’s familial status, similar to determinations ‘in rem.’”). 
32
 See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesley, Comparativist Ruminations from the Bayou on 
Child Custody Jurisdiction: The UCCJA, the PKPA, and the Hague Convention on Child 
Abduction, 58 LA. L. REV. 449, 507 (1998); Wasserman, supra note 6, at 868, 891-92. 
33
 See, e.g., In re R.W., 39 A.3d 682, 696-98 (Vt. 2011); Balestrieri v. Maliska, 622 So. 
2d 561, 562-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); In Interest of S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex. 
1992); Matter of Interest of M.L.K., 768 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Kan. App. 1989); Leonard, 122 
Cal. App. 3d at 457-59; Goldfarb v. Goldfarb, 268 S.E.2d 648, 650-51 (Ga. 1980); but see 
Ex parte Dean, 447 So. 2d 733, 735 (Ala. 1984) (“A child custody determination is an in 
personam proceeding requiring in personam jurisdiction over the affected parties.”) 
(citations omitted). 
34
 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 166 (1901) (quotations and citation omitted); 
see also, e.g., Williams v. State of N. Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942) (“[I]t is plain 
that each state by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its large interest in the 
institution of marriage can alter within its own borders the marriage status of the spouse 
domiciled there, even though the other spouse is absent.”). 
35
 See R.W., 39 A.3d at 696 (“In its role as parens patriae, Vermont is responsible for 
the welfare of resident children and has a strong interest in assuring they are safe and well 
cared for.”) (collecting cases); Von Schack v. Von Schack, 893 A.2d 1004, 1011 (Me. 2006) 
(“Maine has a unique interest in assuring that its citizens are not compelled to remain in 
such personal relationships against their wills[.]”); Jessica Miles, We Are Never Ever 
Getting Back Together: Domestic Violence Victims, Defendants, and Due Process, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 141, 172 (2013) (noting that “the underlying rationale of allowing a state 
to adjudicate the status of a relationship . . . to protect vulnerable persons within its 
borders.”); see also May, 345 U.S. at 536 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Children have a 
very special place in life which law should reflect.”). 
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personal jurisdiction over both spouses or parents.
36
   
 
While these reasons and others
37
 have justified courts’ exercise of 
jurisdiction for the purpose of terminating a marriage or determining child 
custody, they have not been deemed sufficient to justify courts’ exercise of 
jurisdiction over ancillary matters such as alimony and child support that 
involve the property interests of people over whom the court lacks personal 
jurisdiction.
38
  This is because, as the Supreme Court explained in Estin v. 
Estin, the case that established this dichotomy with respect to divorce, the 
considerations that justify the application of the status exception to divorce 
proceedings have “little relevancy” when it comes to disputes over property 
interests.
39
  Instead, the Court held, such disputes—even though they may 
involve marital property or children—were more analogous to disputes over 
other financial issues, and states have “no power . . . to determine the 
personal rights of” a defendant in the absence of personal jurisdiction.40  
Thus, the Court made divorce “divisible”—giving effect to divorce decrees 
entered without personal jurisdiction over one spouse but refusing to do the 
same with respect to other aspects of divorce such as property division and 
alimony.
41
  The Court has similarly held that personal jurisdiction is 
required to render a judgment for child support against a non-resident 
defendant even where the child resides in the forum.
42
   
                                                 
36
 See, e.g., In re Termination of Parental Rights to Thomas J.R., 663 N.W.2d 734, 744 
(Wis. 2003) (“A conclusion that minimum contacts are necessary for child custody 
determinations ignores the realities of child custody proceedings . . . . A requirement of 
minimum contacts would necessitate that a child travel to the state in which his or her 
parent resides. . . . In the case of an abandoned child whose parents live in different states, 
the child might be required to travel to both states to have his or her rights determined. 
Custody determinations involving parents living in foreign nations would pose further 
complications.”) (citations omitted); Wasserman, supra note 6, at 832 (“The Pennoyer 
Court was concerned that an abandoned spouse might be unable to obtain a divorce under 
the laws of the state to which her partner had fled, and thus would be unable to divorce. . . . 
In cases in which the husband’s whereabouts were unknown, an ex parte divorce was the 
wife’s only avenue of redress; personal service was not possible.”) (citation omitted). 
37
 See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 851-53 (discussing other rationales for the status 
exception). 
38
 See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948); Jurado v. Brashear, 782 So. 2d 
575, 576 n.2 (La. 2001). 
39
 Estin, 334 U.S. at 547.  
40
 Id. at 548-49. 
41
 See id. at 549. 
42
 See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 101 (1978).  Kulko did not directly 
address the applicability of the status exception.  See id. at 92 (noting that the parties were 
in agreement that the minimum contacts test governed the case).  However, since Kulko 
was decided, courts have uniformly refused to allow the entry of orders for child support 
under the status exception.  See, e.g., In re Termination of Parental Rights to Thomas J.R., 
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Even with these limitations—and perhaps in part because of them—the 
status exception has been subject to significant criticism by scholars.  Some 
have argued that the doctrine improperly privileges property rights over 
substantive due process rights associated with familial relationships by 
requiring personal jurisdiction when the former is at issue, but not requiring 
it when the latter is at issue.
43
  Others have argued that the status exception 
has outlived the reasoning that justified its creation.
44
  Finally, some 
scholars have argued that the status exception is inconsistent with modern 
personal jurisdiction doctrine’s focus on fairness instead of states’ sovereign 
authority over people within their borders.
45
  Nevertheless, the status 
exception remains deeply embedded in family law practice.      
 
B.  Domestic Violence Restraining Orders & The Status Exception 
 
Because of the close link between the law of domestic violence and family 
law,
46
 courts have debated whether the status exception should be expanded 
to cover the entering of restraining orders against out of state domestic 
violence perpetrators.  Some courts have applied the status exception to 
domestic violence restraining orders on the theory that such orders merely 
concern the protected “status” of the plaintiff.47  Most courts embracing this 
rationale have limited the relief available in such restraining orders by 
refusing to include “affirmative” relief in those orders.48 Other courts have 
                                                                                                                            
262 Wis. 2d 217, 229, 663 N.W.2d 734, 740 n.5 (Wis. 2003); Warwick v. Gluck, 751 P.2d 
1042, 1045 (Kan.  Ct. App. 1988); Rosemarie T. Ring, Personal Jurisdiction and Child 
Support: Establishing the Parent-Child Relationship As Minimum Contacts, 89 CAL. L. 
REV. 1125, 1152 (2001).   
43
 See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 6, at 821.  
44
 See Section III.A, infra; see also Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce 
Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1710-11 
(2011) (“[T]here are no longer any persuasive justifications for exempting a claim for 
divorce from the rules that apply to other civil actions.”).    
45
 See, e.g., Harold S. Lewis, Jr., A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: 
Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1, 52 (1984) (“After Shaffer, 
Rush, and Ireland, the ‘res' and ‘forum state interest’ justifications for casual jurisdiction in 
divorce cases simply will not suffice.”). 
46
 See Camille Carey, Correcting Myopia in Domestic Violence Advocacy: Moving 
Forward in Lawyering and Law School Clinics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 220, 223-31 
(2011); see also Margaret Drew, Lawyer Malpractice and Domestic Violence: Are we 
Revictimizing Our Clients?, 39 FAM. L.Q. 7, 10-11 (2005) (“Many states have incorporated 
the protective order statute within the domestic relations code. . . . Within the exclusive 
confines of family law are many statutory enactments that address the impact of abuse on 
families.”) (citation omitted).  
47
 See, e.g., Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 6-10. 
48
 See, e.g., Caplan, 450 Mass. at 468-72. 
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refused to apply the status exception to domestic violence restraining orders 
at all, finding that restraining orders are not analogous to mere declarations 
of the plaintiff’s status because they are restraints on the defendant’s 
liberty.
49
   
 
1. Domestic Violence Restraining Orders: A Protected Status? 
 
In Bartsch v. Bartsch,
50
 the plaintiff and defendant both grew up in Iowa, 
met at Iowa State University, and were married in Iowa.
51
  Although the 
parties moved to Utah shortly after their marriage, both of their families 
remained in Iowa.
52
  After the move to Utah, the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant physically abused her by—among other things—pushing her and 
threatening her with a gun.
53
  Likely in an effort to flee from her abuser, the 
plaintiff moved with her child back to Iowa and filed an application for a 
protective order shortly after arriving.
54
  The defendant moved to dismiss 
the application on the grounds that the Iowa court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over him.
55
 
 
The Iowa Supreme Court first summarily rejected the plaintiff’s argument 
that Iowa courts did in fact have personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
based on his contacts with Iowa.
56
  The court simply noted that—although 
the defendant “maintained substantial ties to Iowa prior to” moving, “he has 
had virtually no ties to Iowa since that time, except that his wife and child 
now” lived there.57 
 
However, the court held that personal jurisdiction over the defendant was 
unnecessary for the entry of a protective order.
58
  After laying out the status 
exception and examining its application to divorce and child custody 
matters, the court drew parallels to these areas to justify extending the 
exception to domestic violence restraining orders.
59
  The court noted that 
                                                 
49
 See, e.g., Fox, 106 A.3d at 926. 
50
 636 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 2001). 
51
 Appellee’s Final Brief at 4, Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 2001) (No. 00-
0068).  
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. at 5.  The defendant also allegedly physically abused the parties’ minor child.  Id. 
at 6. 
54
 See Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 5. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. at 6. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. at 7-8. 
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one of the justifications for the status exception in the marriage context is 
the state’s interest in preventing bigamy and protecting the offspring of such 
marriages from being illegitimate and observed that the “greater and more 
immediate risk of harm” involved in domestic violence was an “even more 
compelling” reason for applying the status exception in the domestic 
violence context.
60
  The court also argued that one of the primary 
justifications for the status exception in the child custody context—
protecting child residents of the state—was equally applicable to protecting 
adult residents from domestic violence.
61
  Thus, the court concluded that in 
light of the special solicitude Iowa’s domestic violence statute aims to 
provide victims and the court’s belief that “[f]uture violence ought to be 
constrained in any state in which the victim is located,” Iowa courts should 
be able to enter protective orders in the absence of personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant.
 62
 
 
The Bartsch decision was the first to explicitly adopt this approach,
63
 and it 
has proven influential as courts in several states have cited Bartsch to enter 
domestic violence retraining orders in cases where the court purportedly 
could not assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant under traditional 
rules.
64
  However, many of these cases have limited Bartsch by refusing to 
apply the status exception to aspects of domestic violence restraining orders 
that include what can be characterized as affirmative obligations on the 
defendant. 
 
A leading case making this distinction is Shah v. Shah.
65
  There, the 
plaintiff sought a restraining order against her husband in a New Jersey 
court after fleeing from the couple’s marital home in Illinois.66  The plaintiff 
fled to New Jersey to stay with family friends there after allegedly being 
threatened and falsely imprisoned by her husband.
67
  The trial court granted 
a temporary restraining order prohibiting the defendant from harassing the 
                                                 
60
 Id. at 9. 
61
 See id. at 7-9. 
62
 Id. at 9-10 (quotations and citation omitted). 
63
 At least one state—Illinois—had previously enacted a statute which tied jurisdiction 
in domestic violence cases to the jurisdictional test used in child custody cases under the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.  See Gasaway v. Gasaway, 246 Ill. App. 3d 531, 
534 (1993).  As in Section II.A.1, supra, that test is premised upon the applicability of the 
status exception.   
64
 See, e.g., Hemenway, 992 A.2d at 581-82; Caplan, 879 N.E.2d at 122-25. 
65
 875 A.2d 931 (N.J. 2005). 
66
 Id. at 933. 
67
 Id.; Shah v. Shah, 860 A.2d 940, 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (noting that 
the charges in the original petition included “terroristic threats, criminal restraint, false 
imprisonment, and harassment[.]”). 
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plaintiff or otherwise having any contact with her and prohibiting the 
defendant from possessing any firearms.
68
  The order also required the 
defendant to surrender firearms he currently possessed, and to continue 
medical coverage for the plaintiff under his health plan.
69
  The defendant 
argued that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he 
had “never set foot in New Jersey.”70 
 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed that New Jersey courts could not 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant under these circumstances 
but nevertheless approved the entry of a protective order.
71
  Like the court 
in Bartsch, the court held that orders prohibiting acts of domestic violence 
are “addressed not to the defendant but to the victim [because such orders] 
provid[e] the victim the very protection the law specifically allows, and 
prohibi[t] the defendant from engaging in behavior already specifically 
outlawed” and therefore do not impact the defendant’s “substantive 
rights.”72  However, the court held that the same was not true of portions of 
the order that constituted “attempts to exercise [the court’s] coercive power 
to compel action by a defendant over whom the court lacks personal 
jurisdiction.”73  Thus, the order was affirmed to the extent it simply 
prohibited the defendant from contacting the plaintiff, but reversed to the 
extent it placed other requirements on him such as requiring him to 
surrender his firearms.
74
 
 
Other courts have followed Shah’s approach by requiring personal 
jurisdiction for portions of protective orders that impose “affirmative” 
obligations on defendants but not requiring it for orders that merely prohibit 
the defendant harassing or abusing the plaintiff.
75
  For example, in Spencer 
v. Spencer,
76
 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that the distinction 
made by the Shah court “represents the fairest balance between protecting 
                                                 
68
 Shah, 875 A.2d at 933. 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. at 936. 
71
 Id. at 940.   
72
 Shah, 875 A.2d. at 939.  Although the court declined to rely explicitly on the status 
exception, see id. at 940 n.5, its rationale—that the plaintiff is being granted “protection” 
and the defendant’s rights are not substantively impacted—is the same rationale supporting 
the applicability of the status exception.  See Fox, 106 A.3d at 925 (“Although the ‘status’ 
rationale and the ‘it’s-a-mere-prohibitory-order’ rationale are analytically distinct, they are 
connected.”). 
73
 Shah, 875 A.2d at 939. 
74
 See id. at 939-42. 
75
 See, e.g., Hemenway, 992 A.2d at 581-82; Caplan, 879 N.E.2d at 123-24; Spencer v. 
Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).   
76
 191 S.W.3d 14 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006). 
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the due process rights of the nonresident defendant and the state’s clearly-
articulated interest in protecting” victims of domestic violence.77  Thus, in 
that case, which also involved a plaintiff who had obtained a protective 
order against a defendant over whom the court found it lacked personal 
jurisdiction, the court affirmed the portions of the order that prevented the 
defendant from contacting the plaintiff, but reversed those portions of the 
order preventing the defendant from possessing firearms and ordering him 
to attend domestic violence counseling.
78
 
 
The reasoning of some of these cases is curious since even the purportedly 
“negative” portions of these orders typically do more than merely prevent 
the defendant from doing something that is already illegal.  For example, 
the orders in both Shah and Spencer prevented the defendants in those cases 
from contacting the plaintiffs altogether, not merely from engaging in 
illegal harassment.
79
  Although it is not fully articulated in all the cases, the 
implicit justification for bridging this gap between what is already 
forbidden by law and the extra protections these orders provide is the status 
exception.  As one court explained:  
 
A court order that prohibits the defendant 
from abusing the plaintiff and orders him to 
have no contact with and to stay away from 
her . . . serves a role analogous to custody or 
marital determinations, except that the order 
focuses on the plaintiff's protected status 
rather than her marital or parental status.
80
 
 
And, just like those other contexts where the status exception applies, the 
relief available in domestic violence cases is limited to this purportedly 
“status determining” relief as opposed to relief that directly impacts the 
defendant’s liberty or property.  
  
                                                 
77
 Id. at 19. 
78
 Id. 
79
 See id. at 19 (noting that the order prevented the defendant from approaching within 
1000 feet of the plaintiff or members of her family or household); Shah, 184 N.J. at 329 
(noting that the order prevented the defendant from “having any oral, written, personal, 
electronic or other form of contact with plaintiff”) (quotations omitted).    
80
 Caplan, 879 N.E.2d at 123. 
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2. Harsh Results: No Status Exception, No Protection 
 
Not all courts have agreed that the status exception should apply to 
domestic violence cases.  Several courts have found that protective orders—
no matter what relief they include—are direct restraints on defendants’ 
liberty that require personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  Unfortunately, 
the courts reaching this conclusion have not explored other avenues of 
asserting personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, leaving the 
victims in those cases without any relief at all. 
 
For example, in Fox v. Fox,
81
 the plaintiff, a Vermont resident, was severely 
beaten by the defendant, his nephew, after a contentious probate hearing in 
New Hampshire involving the financial affairs and competency of the 
defendant’s father.82  In the process of the confrontation and beating, which 
took place in a parking lot, the defendant noted that the plaintiff had 
Vermont license plates on his car and told the plaintiff that he was recording 
the license plate number “should [he] need it again.”83  The plaintiff then 
filed a petition for a protective order back in his home state of Vermont and 
the defendant objected that Vermont lacked personal jurisdiction over 
him.
84
 
 
The Supreme Court of Vermont held that a final protective order could not 
be issued without obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
85
  In 
rejecting the conclusions reached by other courts, the court noted that 
protective orders—even to the extent they merely prevent contact with the 
plaintiff—do “more than prohibit [the] defendant from engaging in behavior 
already specifically outlawed.  [Such orders] prohibit[t] him from engaging 
in behavior that would be entirely legal but for the court’s order.”86  The 
court concluded that this restraint on the defendant’s liberty is not only a 
                                                 
81
 106 A.3d 919 (Vt. 2014). 
82
 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 5, Fox, 106 A.3d 919 (No. 13-147), 2013 WL 
3874104 (Vt.). 
83
 Id. 
84
 Fox, 106 A.3d at 921-22. 
85
 Id. at 923-26.  The court explicitly declined to decide whether a temporary order 
could issue without personal jurisdiction.  Id. at 926.  The court frames this conclusion as 
being in accord with Shah, see id., however, the Shah court excluded permanent protective 
orders based on the distinction that court drew between affirmative and prohibitory 
portions of protective orders because permanent orders in New Jersey automatically 
include numerous forms of affirmative relief.  See Shah, 184 N.J. at 140 (“A final 
restraining order must, by statutory definition, include affirmative relief.”) (citations 
omitted).  As described below, the Fox court explicitly rejected the affirmative/negative 
relief distinction. 
86
 Fox, 106 A.3d at 926. 
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declaration of the plaintiff’s status, but is also “an enforcement of a liability 
arising from such a status” which could not be entered without obtaining 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant under a traditional due process 
analysis.
87
      
 
The court acknowledged that it was reaching a “harsh result” and that 
forcing a domestic violence victim to return to the state in which the abuse 
occurred “may in some cases be logistically challenging, psychologically 
difficult, or even personally dangerous.”88  However, the court was more 
concerned with the “unpalatable possibilities” presented by the alternative 
approach: 
 
[A] Vermonter with no connection to, for 
example, California could be forced to choose 
between traveling from Vermont to California 
to defend against civil charges of domestic 
violence and accepting the consequences of a 
judicial finding of abuse and an abuse 
prevention order in California because an 
alleged victim of domestic violence chose to 
relocate to California.  Such a scenario 
challenges ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice” protected by the personal 
jurisdiction requirement[.]
89
   
 
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Vermont could assert 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant under traditional jurisdictional 
principals because of his apparent threat with respect to the plaintiff’s 
Vermont license plate.
90
  The court held that because the defendant never 
actually travelled to Vermont or attempted to contact the plaintiff in 
Vermont, he did not purposefully avail himself of the privilege of 
conducting activities in Vermont and therefore could not be subject to 
personal jurisdiction by Vermont courts.
91
 
 
Other courts have similarly refused to enter protective orders of any kind 
without personal jurisdiction.
92
  For example, in Burnett v. Burnett,
93
 the 
                                                 
87
 See id.  
88
 Id. at 927, 929. 
89
 Id. at 927 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). 
90
 Fox, 106 A.2d at 927-29. 
91
 Id. at 928-29. 
92
 See, e.g., Burnett v. Burnett, 2012-Ohio-2673, ¶¶ 11-23, 2012 WL 2196336, at *4-7 
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troubling facts of which are described at the beginning of this Article, the 
Court of Appeals of Ohio refused to assert jurisdiction over the non-resident 
defendant unless the plaintiff could establish that Ohio courts had personal 
jurisdiction over him.
94
 Although the defendant was well aware the plaintiff 
had fled to Ohio and in fact had sent her threatening text messages since she 
arrived there, the court refused to allow the entry of a protective order.
95
  
The court’s decision left the plaintiff with no protective order at all despite 
the obvious danger she faced from her husband. 
 
* * * * * 
Thus, courts remain quite divided on the applicability of the status 
exception to domestic violence cases and even those courts applying the 
status exception have placed serious limitations on the scope of the 
restraining orders issued in those cases.  Although the next section argues 
that the courts refusing to apply the status exception at all have the better of 
the argument, courts on both sides of this debate do a disservice to domestic 
violence victims by focusing solely on the status exception at the expense of 
more carefully considering whether in personam jurisdiction may in fact be 
available.    
 
III.  NO EASY WAY OUT: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INVOLVES NO STATUS  
 
When courts believe they are forced to choose between either applying the 
status exception or denying an alleged victim of domestic violence any 
relief at all, it is understandable that many courts have chosen to apply the 
status exception.  However, the status exception is not the “easy way out” it 
appears to be. The status exception may no longer be consistent with 
modern due process requirements.  Even if the status exception remains 
constitutionally valid, domestic violence protective orders are not 
adjudications of status in the same sense as divorce and custody orders 
because protective orders place real restraints on the defendant’s liberty.  
Moreover, the limited relief courts are able to grant when operating under 
the status exception in domestic violence cases is woefully inadequate to 
protect victims and prevent further violence since courts are unable to grant 
                                                                                                                            
(Ohio Ct. App. 2012); Becker, 937 So. 2d at 1130-31; T.L., 820 A.2d at 512-15. 
93
 2012-Ohio-2673, 2012 WL 2196336. 
94
 See id. at *4. 
95
 2012 WL 2196336, at *6-7.  Although the plaintiff attempted to argue that the text 
messages provided a basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction under traditional 
principals, the court held that the messages were not properly in evidence so it did not 
reach that issue.  Id. 
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so-called affirmative relief such as requiring defendants to relinquish 
firearms or undergo counseling. 
 
A.  The Status Exception: Unconstitutional? 
 
The Due Process Clause’s restriction on states’ ability to exercise personal 
jurisdiction serves to protect individual liberty by ensuring that no person is 
“subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established 
no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.”96  The status exception boldly 
purports to exempt divorce, custody, and (possibly) domestic violence 
related disputes from this restriction and allow courts to render judgements 
in those matters that are binding even over individuals who have not 
targeted the forum where the court sits in any way.  Even if the status 
exception may have been justified when it was recognized by the Court in 
Pennoyer, those justifications have been severely undercut by developments 
in family law, technology, the law of personal jurisdiction, and 
constitutional law that have occurred since that decision.   
The status exception arose long ago in a time when both family law and the 
law of personal jurisdiction were quite different than they are today.  As 
discussed in Part II.A, supra, in the Nineteenth Century, a wife who was 
unable to obtain a divorce from her husband was often prevented by law 
from supporting herself financially.
97
  Without the status exception, if a 
woman’s husband left the state and the woman either did not know where 
her husband went or was unable to travel there to file for a divorce, she 
would have faced a very difficult situation.  The status exception was seen 
as a way to fix this problem by allowing a woman to obtain a determination 
of her “status” as a single person, thus freeing her to support herself without 
her husband.
98
   
 
Of course, today, the law—and indeed constitutional law—takes a very 
different view of women and marriage.
99
  The abandonment of one spouse 
by the other does not alter the abandoned spouse’s ability to make a living. 
                                                 
96
 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
97
 Supra, section II.A.1; but see 10 A.L.R. 778 (Originally published in 1921) (“The 
general rule is to the effect that a wife who has been abandoned by her husband is entitled 
to her subsequent earnings.”) (collecting cases dating as far back as 1737). 
98
 Supra, section II.A.1. 
99
 See Kerry v. Din, No. 13-1402, 2015 WL 2473334, at *7 (U.S. June 15, 2015) 
(opinion of Scalia, J.) (“Modern equal-protection doctrine casts substantial doubt on the 
permissibility of [coverture laws that create] such asymmetric treatment of women citizens 
. . . and modern moral judgment rejects the premises of such a legal order.”). 
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100
  Moreover, because of massive technological changes, it is much easier 
for an abandoned spouse to locate a wayward partner and, if necessary, to 
travel to another state to litigate than it was in the Nineteenth Century.  It is 
still true that the status of being married changes—and in some ways 
impairs—the property rights of each spouse101 and restricts the ability of 
each spouse to remarry.
102
  However, these injuries are no worse than those 
felt by potential plaintiffs with other kinds of claims who have to leave their 
home state to litigate in another forum when their home state lacks personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.  
 
Perhaps the most significant change of all that has occurred since the status 
exception was first established in Pennoyer is the rapid expansion of the 
ability of states to assert jurisdiction over out of state defendants.  At the 
time Pennoyer was decided, personal jurisdiction could be established by a 
court only if the defendant was served while physically present in the forum 
or if the defendant consented to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction.103  
Under this scheme, in the absence of the status exception, a spouse could 
bring a divorce action only in the place where the other spouse happened to 
be.  This essentially would have given an abandoning spouse the ability to 
unilaterally choose the forum for any divorce simply by deciding where to 
go.
104
  Recognizing the status exception allowed courts to avoid this 
inherently unfair consequence of the prevailing jurisdictional rules. 
 
Today, although in-state service is still sufficient to confer jurisdiction, it is 
not required.
105
  Instead, the scope of personal jurisdiction is much broader 
as courts are able to assert jurisdiction over any person who has minimum 
contacts with a forum such that the assertion of jurisdiction is consistent 
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
106
  In the divorce 
                                                 
100
 Modern developments have similarly undermined the rationale of preventing 
illegitimacy—mentioned by the Iowa Supreme Court in Bartsch.  Illegitimacy no longer 
carries the social stigma that it once did, see, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 
140 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting), nor does it carry the legal consequences it once did.  
See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 97-99 (1982).    
101
 For example, under some state laws, certain marital property cannot be alienated 
without the consent of both spouses.  See, e.g., La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2347; Wash. Rev. 
Code Ann. § 26.16.030;  
102
 See 10 C.J.S. Bigamy and Related Offenses § 2 (collecting anti-bigamy statutes). 
103
 Jacobs, supra note 3, at 5-6. 
104
 This requirement also risked the possibility that no forum would be available to 
adjudicate the divorce since the spouse seeking the divorce may be unable to satisfy the 
residency requirements of the state where the abandoning spouse fled.  See 57 A.L.R.3D 
221 (Originally published in 1974).  
105
 See id. at 12. 
106
 See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014).  
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context, this means that even if one spouse flees to another state, the 
abandoned spouse very likely could file for divorce in her home state even 
without the status exception.  The fact that the defendant spouse resided 
with the plaintiff spouse in the marriage that gave rise to the action in the 
forum state would likely be sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the 
minimum contacts test.
107
    
 
A final change that undercuts the validity of the status exception is the 
importance marriage and child rearing have gained as fundamental rights 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Beginning 
with Loving v. Virginia,
108
 the Supreme Court has recognized the right to 
marry as a fundamental right that the state can only interfere with when 
there is a compelling justification for doing so.
109
  Although the Court has 
not always been consistent about the source of this right,
 110
 it is clear that at 
least one basis for the right to marry is that it is a fundamental liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause.
111
  Similarly, starting in the early 
Twentieth Century, the Court also recognized a fundamental right of parents 
to raise their children rooted in the Due Process Clause.
112
 Such rights were 
                                                 
107
 See, e.g., Corr v. Corr, No. FA144124317S, 2015 WL 1758978, at *3 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2015) (“The defendant’s contacts with Connecticut prior to leaving 
were substantial and give rise to specific jurisdiction. . . . [A] significant portion of the 
parties’ marital life took place here in Connecticut.”); Oytan v. David-Oytan, 171 Wash. 
App. 781, 806 (2012) (upholding the assertion of jurisdiction over a husband in an action 
filed against him by his wife where “[b]etween 2007 and 2010, the parties lived in a marital 
relationship in Washington and nowhere else.”); Akinci-Unal v. Unal, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 
212, 217 (2005) (“The husband chose to come to Massachusetts, married here in a civil 
ceremony, and lived here in a marriage for close to six years. Having voluntarily engaged 
in a relationship that has legal consequences, the husband can scarcely be surprised by. . . 
this State’s enforcement of the wife’s rights (if any) that arise from that relationship. 
Certainly he does not defeat the Commonwealth’s power to act merely by leaving the 
jurisdiction[.]”). 
108
 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
109
 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (“Since our past decisions 
make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the classification 
at issue here significantly interferes with the exercise of that right, we believe that ‘critical 
examination’ of the state interests advanced in support of the classification is required.”) 
(citations omitted); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“The freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men.”); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, 2015 WL 2473451, at *12 
(U.S. June 26, 2015) (“Over time and in other contexts, the Court has reiterated that the 
right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.”) (collecting cases). 
110
 Some cases have grounded the right in the Equal Protection Clause as well as the 
Due Process Clause.  See Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right 
to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1386-87 (2010). 
111
 See, e.g., Obergefell, 2015 WL 2473451 at *12-17. 
112
 See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on 
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not recognized or likely even contemplated at the time Pennoyer was 
decided.
113
   
 
Depriving a person of a “status” conferred at the state’s discretion is very 
different than depriving that person of a fundamental right.  Greater 
procedural protections are required to satisfy due process when the state 
seeks to deprive a person of a fundamental right than when other benefits 
are at stake.
114
  The status exception does the opposite.  It deprives out of 
state defendants of their marriage or children with lesser procedural 
protections than those afforded to defendants in other civil cases.  It makes 
no sense for the same Due Process Clause that elevates these relationships 
to fundamental rights to also allow a state’s courts to end those relationships 
without the minimum contacts the Clause requires in all other contexts.  
 
Thus, the status exception was born out of particular circumstances that 
existed at the time of its creation that are largely no longer applicable.  
Without these special circumstances, it is hard to justify continuing to 
adhere to such a radical departure from ordinary jurisdictional rules.  
Although there are arguments for the continuing validity of the status 
exception that are based on modern concerns, they are not entirely 
convincing.  
                                                                                                                            
numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally 
protected.”) (collecting cases).  
113
 See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734-35 (“The State, for example, has absolute right 
to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall 
be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved.”); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 
205 (1888) (“Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do 
with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been 
subject to the control of the legislature.”); Merry Jean Chan, Comment, The Authorial 
Parent: An Intellectual Property Model of Parental Rights, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186, 1192 
(2003) (noting that the Supreme Court did not recognize parental rights under the Due 
Process Clause until the 1920s); see also Obergefell, 2015 WL 2473451, at *48 (“This 
Court’s earliest Fourteenth Amendment decisions appear to interpret the [Due Process] 
Clause as using “liberty” to mean [only] freedom from physical restraint.”) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
114
 See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116-17, 121 (1996) (“M. L. B.’s case, involving 
the State’s authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond, demands the close 
consideration the Court has long required when a family association so undeniably 
important is at stake. . . . Similarly here, the stakes for petitioner M. L. B.—forced 
dissolution of her parental rights—are large, more substantial than mere loss of money.) 
(quotations and citations omitted); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982) 
(“When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents 
with fundamentally fair procedures.”). 
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In the divorce context, some may argue that with the advent of no fault 
divorce, a defendant has a lesser interest in divorce proceedings.
115
  Since 
the plaintiff will be able to obtain a divorce regardless of any defenses the 
defendant might raise, the argument goes, there is no point in requiring 
courts to have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
116
  However, as 
Professor Rhonda Wasserman points out in an article arguing that the status 
exception is unconstitutional, although every state has no fault divorce, 
some states require the consent of both spouses in order to grant a divorce 
on that basis.
117
  Moreover, the fact that a defendant is unlikely to have a 
meritorious defense has never been a factor in personal jurisdiction analysis 
in any other context.
118
  In fact, the Supreme Court has specifically held that 
where a person has been deprived of something in a way that is contrary to 
due process, “it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of 
law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate defense 
upon the merits.”119 
In the child custody context, proponents of the status exception argue that 
child custody is unique in that the interests of a third person—the child—
are primarily at stake rather than the interests of the parties.
120
  Accordingly, 
a jurisdictional test that is “child-centered” rather than “defendant-centered” 
is more appropriate and jurisdiction should be available wherever a child 
resides whose custody needs to be determined.
121
  Without such a test—
proponents argue—it would be difficult if not impossible in at least some 
cases to find a forum with personal jurisdiction over both parents.
122
 
                                                 
115
 See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 851. 
116
 See id. at 851-52. 
117
 Id. at 851-53. 
118
 See, e.g., Fox, 106 A.3d at 929 (“The due process requirement that a court have 
personal jurisdiction before entering a judgment against a defendant applies to those 
defendants with meritorious defenses, as well as those without.”); Pounders v. Chicken 
Country, Inc., 624 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981) (“Appellants’ contention that the 
appellee must show a defense to the action is contrary to the constitutional requirement for 
the establishment of personal jurisdiction in order to adjudicate or exercise judicial power 
over the parties.”).  
119
 Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86-87 (1988) (quoting Coe v. 
Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915)). 
120
 See, e.g., Brigitte M. Bodenheimer & Janet Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction over Child 
Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 229, 236-37 (1979); 
see also Wasserman, supra note 6, at 888 n.381 (collecting sources making similar 
arguments)). 
121
 See Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarm, supra note 120, at 236-37, 252-53. 
122
 See id.at 252; see also Wasserman, supra note 6, at 886 (“For example, if one of the 
parents has lived abroad for a number of years, a minimum contacts requirement could bar 
any state court from determining the child’s custody.”). 
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While the child’s interests are paramount in custody cases, that fact does not 
decrease the parents’ highly important—and constitutionally protected—
interests in such proceedings.  Moreover, litigating in a forum that has 
personal jurisdiction over both parents may in fact be in the child’s best 
interest because each parent will be more likely to appear and present a 
strong and complete case to the court.
123
  Additionally, limiting the potential 
fora to litigate child custody disputes may serve the beneficial purpose of 
decreasing the likelihood of forum shopping—a practice that is particularly 
troubling when the “shopping” requires moving children across state lines 
to gain a litigation advantage.  Finally, in the rare case when there is truly 
no state with personal jurisdiction over both parents, the doctrine of 
jurisdiction by necessity may be invoked.
124
  
  
* * * * * 
 
To be sure, the arguments both in favor of and against the continuing 
constitutionality of the status exception are more numerous and nuanced 
than those presented here.  A complete evaluation of the constitutionality of 
the status exception is outside of the scope of this Article.  However, the 
serious doubts about the constitutionality of the status exception in even the 
contexts where it has traditionally applied counsel against attempting to 
expand the status exception to the very different context of domestic 
violence. 
  
B.  Restraining Orders Do Not Alter Status 
 
Even if the status exception remains constitutional, domestic violence 
restraining orders fit poorly into that doctrine.  The reason is simple: unlike 
divorce and child custody cases, there is no “status” at issue for a court to 
determine.  In the former contexts, the issues that courts are adjudicating 
change the plaintiff’s status in the eyes of the state: divorced or not 
divorced; legal guardian or not.  By contrast, in the context of domestic 
violence restraining orders there is no similar status at issue.  Instead, 
actions seeking restraining orders are much more like actions seeking other 
kinds of equitable relief where the court considers whether to order the 
                                                 
123
 See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 888-89. 
124
 See id. at 887-88.  The doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity allows a court without 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant under the traditional minimum contacts analysis to 
nevertheless hear a case against that defendant where no forum would otherwise be 
available to the plaintiff and the cause of action has some connection with the forum.  See 
Tracy Lee Troutman, Note, Jurisdiction by Necessity: Examining One Proposal for 
Unbarring the Doors of Our Courts, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 401, 414-15 (1988). 
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defendant to refrain from engaging in particular conduct.  Courts and 
commentators have come up with a variety of justifications for treating 
domestic violence restraining orders as orders pertaining to status, but none 
are persuasive on close examination.       
 
Many of the courts discussed in Section II.B.1, supra, that have adopted the 
status exception in domestic violence cases have argued that domestic 
violence restraining orders bestow a “protected” status on the victim.125  For 
example, in Bartsch, the Iowa Supreme Court argued that it was simply 
“preserving the protected status accorded to the plaintiff by” Iowa’s 
domestic violence statute.
126
  But that statute and others like it do not 
contain any special protected status for plaintiffs.  Rather, the Iowa statute 
merely contains a list of restrictions that courts may place on defendants 
such as orders prohibiting defendants from continuing to engage in 
domestic abuse or going near a “plaintiff’s residence, school, or place of 
employment.”127  While such orders certainly confer a benefit on the 
plaintiff by protecting him or her from further abuse, it does not change the 
plaintiff’s status in the eyes of the state in the same way that divorce and 
custody orders do.
128
  Instead, restraining orders serve the same function as 
equitable relief does in other civil actions for which personal jurisdiction is 
a requirement: placing restrictions on the defendant’s conduct in order to 
keep him from harming the plaintiff.
129
  Restraining orders cannot be 
shoehorned into the status exception merely by labeling them as status 
conferring.     
 
Another argument that has appeared in some courts is that personal 
jurisdiction is not necessary to enter a domestic violence restraining order 
                                                 
125
 See, e.g., Caplan, 450 Mass. at 469; Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 6. 
126
 636 N.W.2d at 6. 
127
 Iowa Code Ann. § 236.5(b). 
128
 One could imagine a domestic violence statute that did confer a protected status on 
a plaintiff in the eyes of the state.  For example, a statute could provide that a person who is 
found to be a victim of domestic abuse could be entitled to certain state benefits such as a 
special monitor to quickly notify police of danger or counseling services to deal with 
trauma.  An order under a statute like that would indeed confer a status on the plaintiff 
under state law and a court would likely be able to enter such an order without personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.    
129
 See Bevan J. Graybill, Note, 'til Death Do Us Part: Why Personal Jurisdiction Is 
Required to Issue Victim Protection Orders Against Nonresident Abusers, 63 OKLA. L. 
REV. 821, 858 (2011) (“A victim protection order, which demands or forbids specific 
behavior between the parties, alters the relationship between plaintiff and defendant to the 
same degree as when the court enjoins one farmer from tilling the land of a neighboring 
farmer. . . . Certainly, no one would argue this court order alters the status relationship 
between the farmers.”). 
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when that order merely prohibits conduct that is already illegal.
130
  In Shah, 
for example, the court claimed that an order forbidding the defendant from 
abusing the plaintiff simply prohibited behavior that is already specifically 
outlawed.
131
  Under this view, the defendant is not being ordered to refrain 
from doing anything he
132
 was not already prohibited from doing and 
therefore there is no due process problem with forgoing traditional personal 
jurisdiction analysis. 
 
It is certainly true that the conduct that constitutes domestic abuse is illegal 
with or without a restraining order.  However, even an order that merely 
prohibits the defendant from abusing the plaintiff
133
 carries with it 
significant consequences for the defendant.  For example, such an order 
may have collateral consequences under federal law, including prohibiting 
the defendant from possessing firearms.
134
  And, if the defendant violates an 
order prohibiting him from abusing the plaintiff, he will face not only 
charges for violating the statute prohibiting abuse, but also contempt 
charges for violating the court’s order.135  Thus, it is simply not accurate 
that a restraining order does nothing more than prohibit the defendant from 
doing something that is already illegal.  Such orders place real restrictions 
on the defendant’s conduct and should be treated accordingly. 
 
In what is probably the most comprehensive scholarly article advocating for 
the extension of the status exception to at least some domestic violence 
cases, Professor Jessica Miles argues that a protective order works a 
“profound and fundamental” change in the status of the parties in relation to 
                                                 
130
 See, e.g., Hemenway, 159 N.H. at 688; Shah, 184 N.J. 125, 137-38. 
131
 Shah, 184 N.J. at 137-38. 
132
 Although people of both genders are victims and perpetrators of domestic violence, 
the overwhelming majority of domestic violence is perpetrated by men against women.  
The use of gender neutral terminology under such circumstances may play a role in 
obscuring the “gender-related causes and implications of domestic violence.”  See, e.g., 
Kristen M. Driskell, Note, Identity Confidentiality for Women Fleeing Domestic Violence, 
20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 129, 129 n.1 (2009).  Accordingly, when this Article refers to 
domestic violence situations in the abstract, it will use male pronouns for the alleged abuser 
and female pronouns for the alleged victim. 
133
 As discussed in Part II.B.1, supra, however, many of the cases making this 
argument were actually approving orders that did more than prohibit conduct that was 
already illegal. 
134
 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).  The combination of the status exception and this 
collateral consequence raises similar constitutional concerns to those discussed in section 
III.A., supra, since the right to bear arms, like the right to marry and raise children, is 
constitutionally protected.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008); 
cf. Part III.C., infra (discussing the importance of firearm restrictions to making restraining 
orders effective). 
135
 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-30. 
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each other in much the same way orders of legal separation do in divorce 
cases.
136
  She notes that, while the “technical category of the legal 
relationship between the parties remains unchanged by the entry of a 
[protective order] (e.g., married couples remain married),” the status of the 
relationship is changed because a protective order enjoins contact and 
communication between the parties, therefore altering “the societal and 
legal expectations and constraints attendant to [the] relationship.”137  
Professor Miles concludes that this “change in relationship status” is 
analogous to orders of legal separation, which are available under the status 
exception.
138
 
 
There are at least two flaws in this argument.  First, the existence of a 
“technical” legal status is an important triggering criterion for the 
application of the status exception.  Embracing a more practical definition 
of “relationship status,” as Professor Miles advocates, would allow the 
exception to swallow the rule.  Almost any kind of injunctive relief changes 
the relationship between the parties to a case by requiring one party to 
refrain from doing something that they otherwise would have done in order 
to confer some benefit on, or prevent some injury to, the other party.  For 
example, an order in a trademark case barring the defendant from using a 
mark owned by the plaintiff gives the plaintiff control over the defendant’s 
use of the mark that was absent prior to the litigation.  Such an order 
changes the legal expectations of the parties and also changes society’s 
perception of who is the true owner of the mark.  Yet, no one would argue 
that trademark cases should fit into the status exception.  Thus, the fact that 
an order alters the relationship between the parties is not sufficient to bring 
protective orders within the ambit of the status exception. 
 
Second, as Professor Miles acknowledges, the relationship between the 
parties in domestic violence cases is not always that of a married couple 
such that they have a societal and legal expectation of being in frequent 
contact.
139
  Many states allow victims of abuse suffered at the hands of 
dating partners or non-spouse family members to obtain restraining orders, 
and a few states even allow courts to grant restraining orders against 
persons with whom the plaintiff has no familial or intimate relationship.
140
  
Professor Miles argues that orders pertaining to these situations should also 
be covered under the status exception out of respect for the power of states 
                                                 
136
 See Miles, supra note 35, at 183. 
137
 Id. 
138
 Id. 
139
 See id. at 186. 
140
 See id. at 185-86 & n.267. 
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to define family relationships.
141
  However, statutes that allow such orders 
do not alter the definition of who is in a “family” merely because they are 
classified as “domestic violence” statutes.142  Instead, they are concerned 
with a much broader universe of people who are likely to be perpetrators of 
abuse.  
 
Finally, Professor Miles and some courts argue that applying the status 
exception to domestic violence cases is good policy because it will give 
victims the opportunity to seek relief without returning to the state where 
their abuser lives and potentially endangering themselves in the process.
143
  
A related argument is that the interests purportedly protected by domestic 
violence restraining orders are at least as strong if not stronger than those 
protected by marriage dissolution and custody orders covered by the status 
exception.
144
 
 
This argument is simply the result of the false choice between the status 
exception and no relief for domestic violence victims who flee to other 
states.  If the status exception was indeed the only option for affording 
victims protection, the stretching of the status exception to fit this situation 
would be somewhat understandable, but it is not.  Instead, as discussed in 
Parts IV and V, infra, the stream of commerce doctrine and the effects test 
provide the basis for a new framework for assessing personal jurisdiction in 
domestic violence cases that will often result in the ability of courts to 
exercise full in personam jurisdiction over out of state defendants.  Once the 
option of exercising in personam jurisdiction is on the table, the rationales 
for extending the status exception to cover these cases become much less 
compelling.  Indeed, as discussed in the next section, the status exception’s 
inherent limitations render it unable to provide adequate protection to 
domestic violence victims through truly comprehensive protective orders.    
 
                                                 
141
 Id. at 186. 
142
 For example, prior to Obergefell v. Hodges, several states allowed courts to grant 
domestic violence restraining orders against an intimate partner of the same sex while 
refusing to recognize such relationships as valid marriages.  Compare Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
741.212 (effective Jun. 5, 1997) (the term ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife”) with Peterman v. Meeker, 855 So. 2d 690, 691 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“Therefore, we conclude that the statute does not exclude those 
persons who otherwise meet the requirements for a domestic violence injunction but seek 
protection from a person of the same sex.”). 
143
 See, e.g., Caplan, 450 Mass. at 469-70; Miles, supra note 35, at 156-57.  
144
 See, e.g., Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 7-9.  
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C.  The Status Exception’s Critical Limitations 
 
All courts that have expanded the status exception have at least implicitly 
limited the protective orders available under the exception to those 
containing only “prohibitory” relief (i.e., orders requiring the defendant to 
refrain from doing something) rather than “affirmative” relief (i.e., orders 
requiring the defendant to do something).
145
  The former includes orders to 
stay away from the victim or cease abuse while the latter includes orders 
requiring the defendant to relinquish firearms,
146
 attend counseling,
147
 or 
turn over important documents or other property to the plaintiff.
148
  
Assuming the validity of this distinction,
149
 the unavailability of affirmative 
relief is a serious weakness of the status exception approach because these 
forms of relief are often some of the most effective in preventing future 
abuse.  Similarly, the status exception does not allow domestic violence 
victims to secure money judgments against abusers for child support or 
other financial awards that may be critical to financial independence. 
 
The link between gun violence and domestic violence is well established.
150
  
An abuser is much more likely to kill his victim if the abuser has access to a 
gun.
151
  Guns and domestic violence may make an even deadlier 
                                                 
145
 See, e.g., Hemenway, 159 N.H. at 687-88; Caplan, 450 Mass. at 470-72; Spencer, 
191 S.W.3d at 19; Shah, 184 N.J. at 137-38; see also Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 10 (not 
directly addressing the affirmative/prohibitory relief distinction but noting that “[t]he order 
here does not attempt to impose a personal judgment against the defendant. . . . The district 
court merely ordered the defendant to ‘stay away from the protected party’ and not assault 
or communicate with her[.]”) (citations omitted).  Professor Miles similarly recognizes this 
limitation.  See Miles, supra note 35, at 197-200. 
146
 See Caplan, 450 Mass. at 472; Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at 19. 
147
 See Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at 19. 
148
 See Shah, 184 N.J. at 140. 
149
 A dubious assumption.  See Part III.B, supra. 
150
 See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 427 (2009) (“Firearms and 
domestic strife are a potentially deadly combination[.]”) (citations omitted); United States 
v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 167-68 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he use of firearms in connection with 
domestic violence is all too common[.]”); United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (“That firearms cause injury or death in domestic situations has been established 
by empirical studies.”); Benjamin Thomas Greer & Jeffrey G. Purvis, Judges Going 
Rogue: Constitutional Implications When Mandatory Firearm Restrictions Are Removed 
from Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 275, 276 
(2011) (“Domestic violence coupled with firearms is a volatile, and too often a lethal, 
confluence of events”). 
151
 See United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1409 (2014) (“When a gun was in 
the house, an abused woman was 6 times more likely than other abused women to be 
killed[.]”) (quotations omitted) (citing Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate 
Partner Homicide, DOJ, Nat. Institute of Justice J., No. 250, p. 16 (Nov. 2003)); United 
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“Domestic assaults with 
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combination after the victim has sought a restraining order because 
“[d]omestic violence often escalates in severity over time”152 and abusers 
may be particularly likely to escalate their attacks in order to retaliate 
against the victim for seeking a restraining order.
153
  Empirical studies have 
proven that protective orders that restrict the abuser’s use of firearms cause 
a statistically significant decrease in the number of homicides that occur as 
a result of domestic violence.
154
 
Victims of domestic violence who flee to another state and seek a 
restraining order under the status exception cannot obtain this critical 
protection.  This is particularly problematic since such protection may be 
most needed in cases where victims of abuse flee to other states.  In those 
cases, victims have demonstrated their autonomy and independence from 
their abusers by choosing not only to leave their abusers, but to leave the 
state entirely.  This kind of assertion of autonomy heightens the risk of 
further abuse as the attacker is likely to attempt to reassert his dominance.
155
  
Orders of protection entered pursuant to the status exception will not be 
able to do anything to prevent these episodes of violence from escalating 
through the use of firearms. 
Court ordered counseling for batterers is also a common feature of modern 
orders of protection that cannot be included in orders entered pursuant to 
                                                                                                                            
firearms are approximately twelve times more likely to end in the victim’s death than are 
assaults by knives or fists.”) (citation omitted). 
152
 See Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1408. 
153
 See, e.g., Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of Change 
Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 335 & 
nn.150-51 (2011); see also Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Employers Know Best? The Application 
of Workplace Restraining Orders to Domestic Violence Cases, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 175, 
203 (2014) (“Researchers who have looked at the phenomenon of separation assault have 
noted that batterers increase their aggression and lethality when their control is 
threatened.”) (citations omitted); Carolyn V. Williams, Note, Not Everyone Will "Get It" 
Until We Do It: Advocating for an Indefinite Order of Protection in Arizona, 40 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 371, 395 & n.182 (2008) (collecting cases “where an order of protection . . . did not 
prevent the batterer from killing or abusing the victim.”). 
154
 See Greer & Purvis, supra note 150, at 281. 
155
 See, e.g., Shannon Selden, The Practice of Domestic Violence, 12 UCLA WOMEN’S 
L.J. 1, 25-26 (2001) (“[W]omen who have left abusive relationships are often subject to 
additional violence by partners who attempt to force them to return to the relationship. 
These violent assaults also involve both a physical act and a verbal act that together 
undermine the woman’s claim to recognition, autonomy, and assistance.”); Martha R. 
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 66 (1991) (“[W]omen describe coercive violence escalating after separation — 
violence clearly aimed at denying their autonomy[.]”). 
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the status exception.
156
  Although the effectiveness of such counseling is not 
well established,
157
 there is at least some evidence that ordering batterers to 
undergo treatment can decrease the likelihood that domestic violence will 
recur.
158
  Moreover, this option can be particularly helpful when the parties 
want to continue a relationship.
159
     
Courts also sometimes order domestic violence defendants to turn over 
important personal property the plaintiff has left in the defendant’s 
possession.  If the victim and her attacker share a home, the victim may 
leave the house quickly and be unable to take important personal belongings 
with her such as her birth certificate, social security card, or passport.  In 
fact, the leading case making the affirmative/negative relief distinction, 
Shah, involved just such a situation.
160
  There, after the plaintiff—an Indian 
citizen—had fled the marital home in Illinois to New Jersey and sought a 
protective order against her husband, the trial court entered an order 
requiring the defendant to return the plaintiff’s “work permit, social security 
card, all immigration related documents and . . . personal mail.”161  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court reversed that portion of the trial court’s order 
because it held the trial court had no power to grant such affirmative relief 
in the absence of in personam jurisdiction.
162
  Thus, while the plaintiff 
ostensibly gained an order protecting her from further attacks, she was left 
                                                 
156
 See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered 
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 944 & 
n.912 (1993) (noting that by 1993, at least 33 states authorized courts to order domestic 
violence perpetrators to counseling as part of a protective order). 
157
 See Deborah Epstein et. al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies: 
Prioritizing Victims' Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 467 n.3 (2003) (“Few experimental studies have 
been conducted, and those that exist do not yet provide compelling evidence for treatment 
effectiveness. . . . At the same time, research shows that women whose partners are 
mandated to batterer treatment feel safer[.]”) (citation omitted).  
158
 See, e.g., Julia Weber, Domestic Violence Courts: Components and Considerations, 
2 J. CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS. 23, 31 (2000) ([T]here is ‘fairly consistent 
evidence that [batterers’] treatment ‘works’ on a variety of dimensions and that effects of 
treatment can be substantial.”) (citation omitted); Karen Tracy, Building A Model 
Protective Order Process, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 475, 479 (1997) ([C]ourt-involved batterers 
who are ordered to undergo counseling cannot easily terminate treatment on impulse, 
arguably increasing the chance of rehabilitation.”); see also Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. 
Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and 
Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 946 (1993) (“[O]verall, treated batterers reduced their 
psychological abuse more than untreated offenders under court supervision.”) (citation 
omitted). 
159
 See Mahoney, supra note 155, at 62. 
160
 The facts of Shah are described in more detail in Part II.B.2., supra. 
161
 Shah, 184 N.J. at 130. 
162
 Id. at 140-41. 
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without the ability to even prove she was legally in the United States 
without having to contact the person who allegedly abused her.  This kind 
of extremely difficult situation is likely not uncommon
163
 and represents 
another glaring deficiency of protective orders grounded in the status 
exception.    
Finally, the status exception also fails to offer full protection because of the 
bar on money judgments against the abuser.  It is well-established that the 
status exception does not allow a court to award alimony, child support, or 
any other kind of money judgment.
164
  Whatever inconveniences this 
distinction may cause in the divorce context, it is a crippling limitation in 
the domestic violence context, where victims are often financially 
dependent on their abusers and abusers often use that dependence as a 
means to maintain control.
165
  Obtaining a protective order under the status 
exception may be a hollow victory for a victim who will be unable to obtain 
the monetary relief necessary to free herself from dependence on her 
abuser.
166
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 See Comment, The Effects of Domestic Violence on Welfare Reform: An 
Assessment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act As 
Applied to Battered Women, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 591, 600 (2002) (“Many women have 
been killed after attempting to leave or while planning to leave abusive relationships. For 
these reasons, women often leave quickly, take few belongings, and try to vanish without a 
trace.”); cf. Dana Harrington Conner, To Protect or to Serve: Confidentiality, Client 
Protection, and Domestic Violence, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 877, 888 (2006) (“[T]he abuser may 
threaten or harm what the victim cares about more than herself, such as . . . personal 
items.”) (citing a survey showing that many victims of domestic violence report that the 
abuser destroyed their personal property). 
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 See, e.g., Estin, 334 U.S. at 547-49; Part II.A.3, supra.   
165
 See, e.g., Jamie Haar, Note, Women's Work: Economic Security in the Domestic 
Violence Context, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 471, 473 (2014) (“Researchers say that 
one of the main reasons women return to their abusers is out of need, specifically financial 
need. Due to the abuser’s exercise of power and control over her through economic abuse, 
she is not economically [self] sufficient and, therefore, is forced to return to her abusive 
environment.”); Tracy, supra note 158, at 492 (“Although protective orders are generally 
short-term in nature, long-term financial concerns may deter women from seeking 
necessary protection. Family courts must address the disparate economic consequences of 
divorce and separation on women.”); Susan L. Pollet, Economic Abuse: The Unseen Side of 
Domestic Violence, N.Y. ST. B.J., February 2011, at 40, 41 (“By controlling and limiting 
the victim's access to financial resources, a batterer ensures that the victim will be 
financially limited if he/she chooses to leave the relationship. As a result, victims of 
domestic violence are often forced to choose between staying in an abusive relationship 
and facing economic hardship, which could possibly result in extreme poverty and 
homelessness.”). 
166
 Paula Pierce & Brian Quillen, No Contest: Why Protective Orders Provide Victims 
Superior Protection to Bond Conditions, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 227, 240 (2013).   
10-Feb-16 The Stream of Violence 33 
* * * * * 
Thus, the status exception fails to provide adequate relief to domestic 
violence victims seeking protective orders.
167
  Nevertheless, the reliance on 
the status exception is understandable given the underlying assumption that 
in personam jurisdiction is unavailable in these cases; after all, something is 
better than nothing.  However, as I will demonstrate in the next two 
sections, by reframing domestic violence jurisdiction using the stream of 
commerce doctrine and effects test as a guide, courts will often be able to 
assert in personam jurisdiction over out of state domestic violence 
defendants.  
 
IV.  THE STREAM OF COMMERCE DOCTRINE & THE EFFECTS TEST 
 
In many of the cases discussed above where courts considered the 
applicability of the status exception to domestic violence cases, courts often 
gave short shrift to the possibility of asserting in personam jurisdiction.  
Courts usually dismissed this possibility because the defendant had never 
set foot in the court’s jurisdiction and had a relatively small amount of 
traditional “contacts,” if any, with the forum.  However, in other contexts, 
courts have developed doctrinal pathways for the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over defendants who have little or no contact with a forum but 
engage in intentional activity targeting a forum.  Under the stream of 
commerce doctrine, courts assert jurisdiction over companies who place 
products into the stream of commerce with the knowledge that they will end 
up in a particular forum and the intention that they do so.  The effects test 
allows courts to assert jurisdiction over intentional tortfeasors who target 
another forum with their conduct.  Although both of these doctrines are 
often criticized for being muddled, they reflect a consensus that it is 
consistent with due process to subject a defendant to jurisdiction in a forum 
                                                 
167
 Professor Miles and some courts adopting the status exception in domestic violence 
cases have also suggested that the exception should be limited to temporary as opposed to 
permanent protective orders.  See Miles, supra note 35, at 197-200.  This limitation of the 
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he intentionally targets with the conduct that gives rise to a case, even if he 
does not otherwise have any contacts with the forum. 
 
A.  The Stream of Commerce Doctrine 
 
Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, the bases for acquiring personal 
jurisdiction over out of state defendants were rather limited.  Essentially, a 
defendant either had to be served while physically present in the forum or 
had to consent to personal jurisdiction in the forum in order for a court to 
assert personal jurisdiction over him.
168
  As discussed above, these 
limitations were constitutionalized by the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. 
Neff when the court held that any attempt to expand these traditional 
methods for acquiring personal jurisdiction would violate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
169
 
 
As the country’s economy changed with states growing more 
interconnected and the role of corporations increasing, the Court felt 
compelled to stretch Pennoyer to the breaking point in order to avoid 
injustice in cases where defendants clearly directed their activities toward a 
forum, but were nevertheless unable to be physically served in that 
forum.
170
  Finally, the Court went in a different direction when it decided 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.
171
  In that case, the Court held for the 
first time that a defendant could be constitutionally subject to personal 
jurisdiction “where the defendant ha[s] certain minimum contacts with [the 
forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”172 
 
In the years following International Shoe, the Court has further refined this 
idea into a two part test.  First, courts examine whether the defendant has a 
minimum level of contacts with the forum to justify the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the defendant.
173
  Next, if such contacts are present, the 
court must determine whether, in light of those contacts, asserting 
jurisdiction over the defendant would comport with “fair play and 
substantial justice.”174  
                                                 
168
 See Jacobs, supra note 3, at 5. 
169
 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 728-29. 
170
 See Jacobs, supra note 3, at 6; Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Nineteenth Century 
Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in A Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 
392-94 (2012). 
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 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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 Id. at 316 (quotations and citations omitted). 
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 See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. 
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 See, e.g., id. 
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The Court has further clarified that—for a defendant’s contacts to be 
sufficient under this test, the defendant must engage in “some act by which 
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections 
of its laws.”175  Conversely, the “unilateral activity” of other parties to a 
case has been deemed insufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts 
requirement.
176
   
 
However, this requirement led to another seeming injustice brought on by 
modern commerce.  Companies could sell a product to a distributor,
 177
 who 
could in turn sell the product to a consumer in a state where the original 
company had no connection.  That consumer would then be unable to sue 
the company in the state where the product was purchased if alleged defects 
in the product caused injury.  Courts’ discomfort with results like this led to 
the creation of the stream of commerce doctrine.
178
  Under that doctrine, a 
forum could assert personal jurisdiction over any defendant who should 
have foreseen that its product would end up being sold in that forum in the 
regular course of commerce.
179
   
 
The Supreme Court first mentioned the stream of commerce theory in 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
180
 where the Court sent a 
mixed message about the theory’s viability.  In that case, the Court rejected 
the exercise of jurisdiction by Oklahoma courts over a car dealership in 
New Jersey simply because the plaintiffs drove the car to Oklahoma and it 
is foreseeable that a car could be driven anywhere.
181
 In doing so, the Court 
flatly rejected the notion that foreseeability alone is sufficient to give rise to 
personal jurisdiction.
182
  However, the Court also noted a state would not 
“exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it assert[ed] personal 
jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of 
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commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in 
the forum State.”183  Thus, while refusing to allow the assertion of 
jurisdiction based on the foreseeable use of a product in a forum, the Court 
seemed to endorse the assertion of jurisdiction based on the foreseeable sale 
of a product in a forum.
184
 
 
In Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,
185
 the Court had an 
opportunity to take on the stream of commerce doctrine directly.  In that 
case, a Taiwanese company manufactured a tube used inside a tire that was 
allegedly the cause of an injury in California due to a defect.
186
  After the 
consumer sued the Taiwanese company in California, the Taiwanese 
company filed a cross complaint seeking indemnification against a Japanese 
company that manufactured the tube’s valve assembly.187  The Japanese 
company claimed that California’s courts could not properly exercise 
jurisdiction over it because it had made no direct contacts with 
California.
188
  
 
The Court unanimously agreed that California could not exercise 
jurisdiction over the Japanese company but the Justices were sharply 
divided on the reasons why.  Eight justices agreed that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over the Japanese company would fail the second step 
of the minimum contacts analysis because forcing the Japanese company to 
defend itself in California courts in a dispute with a Taiwanese company 
only tangentially related to California would not be consistent with fair play 
and substantial justice.
189
  However, when it came to the minimum contacts 
portion of the analysis and the stream of commerce theory, no opinion could 
garner the votes of five justices.   
 
Justice O’Connor, in a portion of her opinion joined by three other justices, 
argued that placing a product in the stream of commerce should only be a 
sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction when the defendant engages in 
“additional conduct [indicating] an intent or purpose to serve the market in 
the forum State” such as designing the product for the market in that state, 
                                                 
183
 Id. at 297-98. 
184
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advertising in that state, or marketing the product through a distributor 
there.
190
  The Japanese company’s mere awareness that the stream of 
commerce may have resulted in its product being sold in a California was, 
by itself, insufficient.
191
  Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by three 
other justices, disagreed.  He argued that if a defendant places a product in 
the stream of commerce and should reasonably expect that it could be sold 
in a particular forum, the minimum contacts requirement should be satisfied 
without any requirement of additional conduct.
192
  Accordingly, because the 
Japanese company was aware that the final product would ultimately be 
sold in California, its contacts were sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the 
minimum contacts test.
193
 The Court’s split in Asahi194 led to a split in 
lower courts, with some adopting Justice O’Connor’s version of the stream 
of commerce test, and others adopting Justice Brennan’s approach.195   
 
The Court again returned to the stream of commerce doctrine over twenty 
years later in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.
196
  In that case, the 
plaintiff was injured in his workplace by a metal sheering machine.
197
 The 
machine was manufactured by an English company and then sold to a 
distributor based in Ohio, who then sold the machine to the plaintiff’s 
employer.
198
  In a products liability suit against the manufacturer, the 
employer argued that it could not be subject to personal jurisdiction in New 
Jersey.
199
 
 
Although the Court rejected the exercise of jurisdiction by a vote of six to 
three, the Court again produced a fractured decision with no opinion 
garnering a majority of the Justices.  In an opinion for a plurality of four 
Justices, Justice Kennedy argued that the Court should endorse Justice 
O’Connor’s Asahi opinion and only permit the exercise of jurisdiction 
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38 The Stream of Violence 10-Feb-16 
where “the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum” with some 
other conduct.
200
  Applying that test, Justice Kennedy concluded that New 
Jersey could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant because 
the defendant’s sale of the metal sheering machine to its Ohio distributor at 
most showed an intent to target the United States as a whole rather than 
New Jersey specifically.
201
  In a dissenting opinion for three Justices, 
Justice Ginsburg strongly disagreed.  Echoing Justice Brennan’s approach, 
she argued that by instructing its distributor to sell its products anywhere in 
the United States, the defendant should have foreseen that its products 
would be sold in New Jersey, the state with the largest scrap metal 
market.
202
 
 
In a concurring opinion for himself and Justice Alito, Justice Breyer agreed 
with the plurality that New Jersey courts could not exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, but felt that the case did not present a good 
vehicle for resolving the conflict in Asahi.
203
  Justice Breyer felt that both 
approaches suggested in Asahi would lead to the same result in this case 
because the machine at issue was not sold as part of a regular flow of the 
defendant’s products into New Jersey and therefore the defendant could not 
have had a reasonable expectation that one of its products would end up 
there.
204
  
 
* * * * * 
 
Thus, after Nicastro, courts were left with little more guidance about the 
stream of commerce doctrine than they had after Asahi.
205
  However, a few 
common threads relevant to domestic violence jurisdiction can be gleaned 
from these opinions.  First, a defendant’s knowledge about the 
consequences of his or her intentional actions is relevant to the 
jurisdictional inquiry.  Under Justice Brennan’s approach, the knowledge 
(or constructive knowledge) that the sale of a product into the stream of 
commerce will ultimately result in that product being sold in a forum is 
alone sufficient to subject a defendant to jurisdiction.  Justice O’Connor’s 
approach requires an intentional act by the defendant that—in light of the 
defendant’s knowledge—reflects an intention to target the forum.  Thus, 
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both approaches accept that the defendant’s knowledge about the 
geographic reach of his actions plays a role in the jurisdictional calculus. 
 
Second, and relatedly, the stream of commerce doctrine is built upon the 
idea that intentional actions by the defendant that have an effect in another 
forum can be the basis for subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction in that 
forum.  Although Woodson teaches us that a mere negligent act by a 
defendant that has some effect in another forum is insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction, such an effect can confer jurisdiction when combined with 
some evidence of an intention to cause such an effect.  For example, Justice 
O’Connor’s noted in Asahi that her conclusion may have been different had 
the defendant “control[ed] or employ[ed] the distribution system that 
brought its valves to California.”206  In other words, if the defendant’s 
intentional activities had been what brought the valves to California and 
caused the injury there, it could have been subject to jurisdiction.  Similarly, 
the dissent in Nicastro argued that jurisdiction was appropriate “at the place 
[the defendant’s] products cause[d] injury[,]” New Jersey, because the 
defendant controlled a distribution system that intentionally targeted the 
entire country.
207
   
 
Third, the stream of commerce doctrine is concerned with not just any 
effects in a forum, but effects that have some impact on the forum itself, 
rather than merely individuals within the forum.  As the Nicastro plurality 
put it, the defendant’s actions must be “directed at the society or economy” 
of the forum.
208
  Actions with these kind of effects in a forum—like selling 
products into a state through a distribution system—“invoke the benefits 
and protections of [the state’s] laws”209 and therefore either manifest an 
intent to submit to the sovereign authority of the forum
210
 or make it fair 
and reasonable to subject the defendant to jurisdiction in that forum.
211
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Similarly, “in some cases . . . the defendant might well [be subject to 
jurisdiction] by reason of his attempt to obstruct [a forum’s] laws.”212  Thus, 
when a defendant’s actions have effects on the legal, economic, or societal 
ecosystem of a state, the defendant is much more likely to be subject to 
jurisdiction in that state. 
 
B.  The Effects Test 
  
The Court has, in fact, confronted personal jurisdiction issues in situations 
involving a defendant’s effort to “obstruct” another state’s laws through the 
commission of an intentional tort allegedly targeting at a plaintiff in that 
state.  In these cases, the Court has developed a separate gloss on the 
purposeful availment requirement specific to intentional torts known as the 
“Calder effects test,” 213 a name that stems from the case that laid out that 
test, Calder v. Jones.
214
 
In Calder, an actress sued two reporters with the National Enquirer for libel 
in California based on allegedly defamatory statements contained in an 
article that was published in the Enquirer.
215
  The defendants,
216
 who lived 
in Florida and wrote the article at issue there, argued that California courts 
could not assert personal jurisdiction over them.
217
  The defendants 
apparently wrote the entire article without setting foot in California, and 
instead conducted all of their research and interviews by phone.
218
  
Nevertheless, the Court found the assertion of jurisdiction over the 
defendants proper.
219
 
The Court concluded that jurisdiction in California was consistent with due 
process because California was “the focal point both of the [allegedly 
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libelous] story and of the harm suffered.”220  That was because the allegedly 
libelous story was very focused on California since it was drawn from 
California based sources and concerned the activities of a California 
resident whose career was centered in California.
221
  Moreover, the 
plaintiff’s emotional distress and injury to her professional reputation would 
be felt almost entirely in California.
222
 
The defendants argued that, since they did not distribute the articles 
themselves, this case was more analogous to Woodson where the mere fact 
that the dealer could foresee that a car might travel to another state was not 
enough to subject it to jurisdiction in that state.
223
  In rejecting this 
argument, the Court established a key distinction between intentional torts 
and other kinds of lawsuits: 
[Defendants] are not charged with mere 
untargeted negligence. Rather, their 
intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions 
were expressly aimed at California. 
[Defendants wrote and] edited an article that 
they knew would have a potentially 
devastating impact upon [plaintiff]. And they 
knew that the brunt of that injury would be 
felt by [plaintiff] in the State in which she 
lives and works and in which the National 
Enquirer has its largest circulation. Under the 
circumstances, [defendants] must ‘reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there’ to 
answer for the truth of the statements made in 
their article. An individual injured in 
California need not go to Florida to seek 
redress from persons who, though remaining 
in Florida, knowingly cause the injury in 
California.
224
 
Thus, the Court established the principal that, when an intentional tort is 
“expressly targeted” toward a particular state, this express targeting can 
constitute sufficient purposeful availment to justify the exercise of 
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jurisdiction by that state even where the defendant otherwise lacks 
significant contacts with the forum.
225
 
After staying silent on the subject for thirty years after Calder, the Court 
finally returned to the effects test in Walden v. Fiore.
226
  In that case, the 
plaintiffs were two Nevada residents who alleged that a federal Drug 
Enforcement Agency agent improperly seized their money and detained 
them while they were traveling through Atlanta’s airport.227  The plaintiffs 
also alleged that the same DEA agent filled out an affidavit with false 
information in an effort to justify the seizures.
228
  The plaintiffs sued the 
DEA agent in Nevada alleging violations of their constitutional rights.
229
  
The DEA agent argued that he could not be subject to personal jurisdiction 
in Nevada, despite his knowledge that the plaintiffs resided there.
230
 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the defendant.
231
  
The Court reiterated the long established principal that the plaintiff’s 
residency alone cannot be the only link between the defendant and a forum 
to establish jurisdiction.
232
  Instead, the defendant must engage in conduct 
that forms the necessary connection with the forum state.
233
  The Court 
described Calder as being consistent with that principal because in that case 
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“the reputation-based ‘effects’ of the alleged libel connected the defendants 
to California, not just to the plaintiff.”234  The Court noted that because of 
the nature of libel, the tort in Calder actually occurred in California, where 
the article was read and distributed, not in Florida where the article was 
written.
235
  For these reasons, the defendants conduct in in Calder was 
actually connected to California itself, rather than just to a California-based 
plaintiff.
236
   
By contrast, in this case, the Court held the conduct that gave rise to the 
lawsuit—the seizure and filing of the false affidavit—took place entirely in 
Georgia.
237
  The Court rejected the idea that the defendant’s knowledge that 
the plaintiffs were from Nevada and would suffer injury in Nevada as a 
result of his conduct was sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction 
over him.
238
  The fact that the plaintiffs suffered injury from not having 
their money in Nevada was not “tethered to Nevada” in any meaningful 
way; “unlike the broad publication of the forum-focused story in Calder the 
effects of the [defendant’s] conduct on [plaintiffs were] not connected to 
[Nevada] in a way that [made] those effects a proper basis for 
jurisdiction.”239   
The Court’s efforts to distinguish Walden from Calder are not entirely 
persuasive, as several scholars have observed.
240
  After all, Calder seemed 
to turn on the defendant’s knowledge that the plaintiff would be injured in 
the forum, not the defendant’s intentional targeting of the forum as a 
whole.
241
 However persuasive the Court’s description of Calder may be, it 
does offer a coherent post hoc justification of the differing results in the two 
cases. In both Walden and Calder, the defendants knew that the plaintiffs 
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would be injured in the forums at issue, however; only in Calder did the 
effects of the defendant’s conduct extend beyond the plaintiffs to impact the 
state’s economy, society, or political system.   
* * * * * 
Thus, after Walden, the effects test turns on (1) whether the defendant has 
knowledge that his conduct will have an impact in a forum, (2) whether his 
conduct does in fact have such an impact, and (3) whether that impact is 
targeted at the forum as a whole or just at individual plaintiffs who happen 
to reside there.  These requirements bring the effects test somewhat into 
alignment with the stream of commerce doctrine in that both require 
knowledge on the part of the defendant about the likely results of his or her 
conduct and both require conduct that reflects an intention to target a forum 
as a whole.  This is consistent with the Walden Court’s statement that the 
same jurisdictional principals that apply to other torts apply when 
intentional torts are involved.
242
  
 
However, Walden’s dicta to the contrary notwithstanding, there are still 
differences in the way the Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine treats 
intentional torts
243
 and non-intentional torts.  To understand that difference, 
it is important to separate two kinds of “intentionality” the Court is 
concerned with in personal jurisdiction cases.  One kind, is “action 
intentionality”—that is, whether the conduct giving rise to the claim was 
intentional or not.  This is the distinction between intentional torts and other 
torts (those based on negligence or strict liability).  The other kind is “forum 
targeting intentionality”—that is, whether the defendant did something to 
intentionally target the specific forum that is asserting jurisdiction over him.  
What the stream of commerce and effects test cases show is that where 
action intentionality is present, the requirements for forum targeting 
intentionality are somewhat relaxed.   
In the stream of commerce context, where action intentionality is not 
present, the Court is very stringent about ensuring that forum targeting 
intentionality exists.  Disagreements over whether such intent exists, how to 
prove such intent, and the level of intentionality required are precisely the 
problems that gave rise to the warring opinions in Asahi and Nicastro.  As 
the doctrine has developed, it has become much harder for mere knowledge 
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issue in Walden.  The Court used the phrase similarly in Walden.  See id. 
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that a product could end up in a particular forum to satisfy due process 
requirements.  In contrast, when it comes to intentional torts,
 
which, by 
definition, include action intentionality, knowledge is a much more 
palatable basis for satisfying the forum targeting intentionality requirement.  
This is reflected in both Calder and Walden where the focus of the Court’s 
analysis was on how the claimed conduct of the defendants in those cases 
had an impact on the forums at issue, not on the state of mind of the 
defendants with respect to the forums.  In both cases the only evidence of 
forum targeting intentionality was the defendants’ knowledge that their 
conduct could have effects in California and Nevada respectively.  The 
difference was that in Calder, the researching and publication of the article 
had a large impact in California, whereas in Walden, the seizure of the cash 
and drafting of the affidavit had a minimal impact in Nevada.  By contrast, 
under the stream of commerce doctrine—at least in its more stringent 
formulations—knowledge alone is insufficient to give rise to jurisdiction 
even where the effects of the defendant’s conduct are widely felt in the 
forum.    
Therefore, another important guiding principal that can be gleaned from the 
effects test is that where action intentionality is present, the requirement of 
forum targeting intentionality is relaxed to the point that mere knowledge is 
largely sufficient provided that the conduct at issue has far reaching effects 
in the forum.
244
  This makes sense within the larger context of personal 
jurisdiction doctrine because it reflects the overriding focus on the 
defendant’s agency that has been present since the purposeful availment 
requirement was added.  A defendant should be able to make a choice that 
determines whether or not he or she will be subject to jurisdiction in the 
forum, and not have that choice made for him by third parties.
245
  In the 
context of negligence or strict liability, the forum targeting intentionality 
requirement exists to ensure that a real choice is involved since the 
underlying conduct does not involve one.  In the context of intentional 
conduct, since the offending conduct itself is the result of a conscious 
choice, courts can take a relaxed view of the forum targeting intentionality 
requirement, and still protect the defendant’s agency.  
                                                 
244
 See Halaby, supra note 225, at 631-32. 
245
 See Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297 (“The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the orderly 
administration of the laws, gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows 
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to 
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”) (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
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V.  REFRAMING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE JURISDICTION: THE KNOWLEDGE TEST 
 
The stream of commerce doctrine and the effects test have been often 
(rightly) criticized for being muddled and unclear.  However, the broad 
principals embedded in these two lines of cases provide a framework for 
formulating a new test for domestic violence jurisdiction.  A defendant’s 
mere knowledge that his conduct could have an effect in a forum is 
generally insufficient to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction over 
him in that forum.
246
  However, the stream of commerce doctrine teaches us 
that where the defendant knows that his or her conduct is likely to cause an 
effect in another forum and takes specific action to target that forum, the 
assertion of jurisdiction may be proper.  In turn, the effects test posits that 
where an intentional tort is committed and the effects of the intentional tort 
are felt not just by the victim, but by the forum as a whole, the defendant’s 
knowledge alone may be sufficient to give rise to jurisdiction. 
 
In the following subsections, I will demonstrate that in domestic violence 
cases, the alleged misconduct by the defendant is: (1) intentionally designed 
to target forums where the plaintiff might flee, and (2) likely to have effects 
in those forums that go well beyond the individual plaintiff involved.  
Therefore, it is proper to subject domestic violence defendants to 
jurisdiction in any forum where the defendant knows or should know his 
victim may flee.  I will refer to this test as the Knowledge Test.      
 
A.  Intentionality 
 
Although actions seeking domestic violence restraining orders are equitable, 
they are similar to intentional tort actions in that both require the plaintiff to 
prove the defendant engaged in intentional conduct.
247
  A restraining order 
is never granted on the ground that the defendant threatened or injured the 
plaintiff accidentally—instead, the defendant must commit an intentional 
act—usually one that is violent or threatening such that the plaintiff is 
placed in reasonable fear that the defendant may attack her (or attack her 
again).
248
  Thus, actions seeking domestic violence restraining orders carry 
the same inherent action intentionality that triggers the effects test in 
intentional tort cases.   
                                                 
246
 See Section IV.A, supra. 
247
 See Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 122-24 & 
n.7 (2001). 
248
 See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Domestic Abuse and Violence § 6. 
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Although the presence of action intentionality relaxes the forum targeting 
intentionality requirement, it does not eliminate it.  Walden makes clear that 
even if an intentional tort defendant knows the plaintiff he is intentionally 
harming may travel to another state, that is not sufficient to give rise to 
jurisdiction in that state without some additional indication that the 
defendant intended to target that state.  However, domestic violence is 
different from other intentional torts in at least two critical ways that help 
satisfy this requirement.  First, domestic violence is almost always part of a 
larger pattern of coercive control by the batterer rather than an isolated 
incident.  Second, domestic violence by definition takes place between 
people with a pre-existing relationship—often a close one—that gives the 
perpetrator more knowledge about the potential effects of his conduct in 
other forums.   
Unlike an ordinary intentional tort like the ones at issue in Calder and 
Walden, domestic violence is not a discrete harm that one person does to 
another in a single instance.  Rather, it is well established that domestic 
violence is a pattern of behavior by the batterer designed to establish control 
over the victim.
249
  That control is not limited to the times when physical 
attacks are occurring or even when the batterer is physically present.
250
  
Rather, the batterer places the victim in an ongoing state of terror designed 
                                                 
249
 See, e.g., Mary Przekop, One More Battleground: Domestic Violence, Child 
Custody, and the Batterers’ Relentless Pursuit of Their Victims Through the Courts, 9 
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1053, 1058 (2011) (Psychologists, scholars, and social scientists 
agree that domestic violence is defined as ‘a pattern of behavior in a relationship by which 
the batterer attempts to control his victim through a variety of tactics.’ . . . Domestic 
violence is about coercive control of another and deprivation of their liberty.”) (citation 
omitted); National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, What is Domestic Violence?, 
http://www.ncadv.org/need-support/what-is-domestic-violence (last visited Jul. 22, 2015) 
(“Domestic violence is the willful intimidation, physical assault, battery, sexual assault, 
and/or other abusive behavior as part of a systematic pattern of power and control 
perpetrated by one intimate partner against another.”); see also Donald G. Dutton, THE 
DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 
112 (1995) (finding that over 60% of men who batter their wives do so repeatedly). 
250
 See, e.g., Michael P. Johnson, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE 
TERRORISM, VIOLENT RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE 6, 9, 26 (2008) 
(“Although each particular act of intimate violence may appear to have any number of 
short-term, specific goals, it is embedded in a larger pattern of power and control that 
permeates the relationship.”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the 
Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 959, 966 (2004) (“Episodic physical violence, while often a devastating 
manifestation of the abuser's control, does not fully define its contours or map its 
reaches.”); see also Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological 
and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1295, 1318 (1993) (“[U]nderstanding the pattern of control makes it easier to understand 
how she ‘didn't leave’ during the time when he ‘wasn’t violent.’”). 
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to ensure her continued subjugation.
251
 Moreover, domestic violence does 
not end when the victim leaves the batterer, and in fact, in many cases is 
likely to escalate.
252
  Batterers are well aware of the fact their relentless 
abuse may cause the victim to rationally choose to escape by fleeing 
elsewhere.  In fact, research shows that batterers’ efforts to control their 
victims are at least partially motivated by a desire to keep the victim from 
leaving permanently.
253
   
When a person engages in domestic violence with the knowledge that the 
victim may seek refuge in another state, the batterer is also aware—and 
perhaps hoping—that his pattern of violence will continue to affect the 
victim even if she chooses to flee to that state and perhaps ultimately 
compel her to return to him.  This is very different from the usual 
intentional tortfeasor who is simply seeking to impose a one-time injury on 
the plaintiff without any aim to exert ongoing control.  The DEA agent in 
Walden may have known that the plaintiffs lived in Nevada, but by seizing 
their cash, he did not intend to visit any ongoing harm to the plaintiffs in 
Nevada beyond the loss of the money.  By contrast, domestic violence is an 
ongoing harm that is designed to subject the victim to the batterer’s control 
in any state where she travels.
254
   
Indeed, obtaining a domestic violence restraining order usually requires the 
plaintiff to demonstrate a current fear or likelihood of further violence.
255
  
Where a plaintiff flees to another state and seeks a restraining order, this 
element of her claim cannot be completed until she arrives in the destination 
state and actually files her claim while being in a continuing state of fear or 
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 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 250, at 37-38. 
252
 See, e.g., Przekop, supra note 249, at 1055 (“[A] woman escaping an abusive 
relationship has a 75 percent greater risk of severe injury or death than a woman who 
remains with her abuser.”); see also supra note 155 (collecting sources discussing 
separation assault). 
253
 See Natalie Loder Clark, Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victims and 
Perpetuating Violence, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 291-92 & n.104 (1987); Kathleen 
Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, 
Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 286-89 & n.101 (1985). 
254
 Of course, if a specific case truly does raise an isolated incident that is not 
connected to a larger pattern of domestic violence and intimidation, then the Knowledge 
Test may not be appropriate.  However, such cases are likely to be rare, both because of the 
nature of domestic violence, and because restraining orders are generally unavailable when 
only a single incident is alleged.  See, e.g., L.M.F. v. J.A.F., Jr., 24 A.3d 849, 858 (N.J. 
App. Div. 2011) (refusing to grant a restraining order over an “isolated incident” of 
harassment where it was not accompanied by other threatening or violent behaviors and 
noting the requirement that the victim demonstrate an order is “necessary to prevent future 
abuse”).    
255
 See, e.g., 28 C.J.S. Domestic Abuse and Violence § 5 
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danger.  Thus, just like the defamation in Calder, the cause of action for a 
domestic violence restraining order is actually completed in the forum 
where the plaintiff files her claim.   
Even so, the victim’s decision to flee to a another state is—on its own—not 
sufficient to give rise to jurisdiction in whatever state she travels to, rather, 
the defendant must know the specific state to which the plaintiff will flee.
256
 
Domestic violence perpetrators are uniquely positioned to know the 
locations where their victims are likely to flee because of the close 
relationship between the batterer and the victim.  Domestic violence is, by 
definition, limited to violence between people who have a close relationship 
with each other.
257
  Accordingly, a batterer is very likely to know the victim 
well enough to have some idea of where the victim might go to seek refuge 
from his attacks.  This is particularly true where the victim seeks refuge 
with close friends or family, as victims of domestic violence often do.
258
 
The typical domestic violence defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s 
likely avenues of escape is nicely illustrated by many of the cases discussed 
in Part II.B, supra, where the applicability of the status exception was 
litigated.  For example, in Burnett v. Burnett, the case described in the 
Introduction, it is highly likely that the defendant was well aware that the 
plaintiff—who he had been married to for seven years—might flee to Ohio 
where her family lived.
259
  In fact, the defendant had previously attended 
family gatherings in Ohio at the plaintiff’s family home.260  And in Bartsch, 
the Iowa Supreme Court case that led the way in applying the status 
exception to domestic violence, the parties had met in Iowa while both were 
attending school there and the plaintiff’s parents—who she went to live 
                                                 
256
 See Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires 
a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis.”). 
257
 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (limiting the definition of domestic 
violence for purposes of federal firearm prohibitions to violent acts “committed by a 
current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the 
victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with 
the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, 
parent, or guardian of the victim.”); 25 AM. JUR. 2D Domestic Abuse and Violence §§ 8-10 
(describing various state definition of domestic or family violence which include violence 
between household members, parents of children, dating partners, and other people in 
personal relationships).      
258
 See Graybill, supra note 120, at 823 (“When victims of domestic violence flee the 
homes they share with their abusers, they often seek refuge with friends, family, or in 
shelters, and many move to another city or state to hide from their abuser.”). 
259
 See Burnett, 2012-Ohio-2673, 2012 WL 2196336, at *1-3.  Indeed, the plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant “knew all the places she would go” to flee from him.  Id. at *1. 
260
 See id. at *3. 
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with when she sought the protective order—continued to live in Iowa 
throughout the parties’ five year marriage.261  Even in Fox, where the 
parties were an uncle and his nephew instead of a couple in an intimate 
relationship, the contentious court battle over estate issues the parties were 
involved in that precipitated the nephew’s alleged attack likely would have 
revealed to the nephew his uncle’s address in Vermont if he was not already 
aware of it from their familial relationship.
262
  Moreover, right as the attack 
was occurring in the courthouse parking lot, the nephew told the uncle he 
was memorizing his Vermont license plate in case he “need[ed] it again.”263 
These examples illustrate what is likely true in many domestic violence 
cases—that the attacker has a very good idea of the states where the victim 
may choose to flee.
264
 
As the Knowledge Test recognizes, the defendant may not be aware of the 
plaintiffs’ likely destination in every case.  In cases where the defendant 
does not know where the plaintiff has fled, a restraining order may be 
unnecessary or even harmful since it could alert the defendant to the 
plaintiff’s location.265  However, in cases where the defendant engages in 
domestic violence knowing the plaintiff might flee to a particular state, he is 
engaging in intentional conduct targeting that forum since he intends his 
campaign of terror to extend into that forum.  This is sufficient to satisfy the 
                                                 
261
 See Appellee’s Final Brief at 4-5, Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3 (No. 00-0068).  In fact, 
the defendant’s parents also lived in Iowa throughout the marriage not far from where the 
plaintiff’s parents lived.  Id. 
262
 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 5, Fox, 106 A.3d 919 (No. 13-147), 2013 WL 
3874104 (Vt.). 
263
 Id.  
264
 This is true in at least two other major cases discussing applicability of the status 
exception.  See Hemenway, 159 N.H. at 683 (noting that the defendant sent a threatening 
letter to the plaintiff’s New Hampshire address); Caplan, 450 Mass. at 464 (noting that the 
parties met in Massachusetts approximately six years before the action was filed, that the 
plaintiff took periodic trips to Massachusetts during the parties’ marriage and that “the 
defendant had telephoned the plaintiff's father's house in Massachusetts [and] had 
telephoned his own friends in Massachusetts apparently trying to locate the plaintiff” after 
she fled to Massachusetts).  Other cases did not include enough information to know for 
sure whether the defendant would have had some idea about where the plaintiff might flee.  
See Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at 16 (noting that the plaintiff fled to Kentucky to stay with “a 
close friend” after suffering abuse at the hands of her husband who she knew for at least 
seven years); Shah, 184 N.J. at 129 (noting that the plaintiff sought refuge with “family 
friends” in New Jersey after about two years of marriage).  It is likely that at least part of 
the reason the record was not as well developed on that issue in those cases is because of 
the plaintiffs’ reliance on the status exception.    
265
 See Annie Pelletier Kerrick, Protections Available to Victims of Domestic Violence: 
No Contact Orders, Civil Protection Orders, and Other Options, 54 ADVOCATE 32 (2011). 
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forum targeting intentionality requirement since the defendant’s underlying 
conduct giving rise to the cause of action is intentional.   
B.  Effects 
 
As cases like Walden and Nicastro demonstrate, causing injury in a 
forum—even on purpose—is insufficient to give rise to jurisdiction.  
Instead, the key question is what kind of injury batterers cause in these fora?  
If the injury is confined just to the plaintiff herself, then it may be 
insufficient to give rise to personal jurisdiction.  But, if the injury spreads to 
the society and economy of the forum, then the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction is justified.  There is no doubt that the latter type of harm is 
visited on forums where domestic violence victims flee to escape abuse. 
The enormous costs to society of domestic violence are well documented
266
 
and are likely to be even higher for states receiving fleeing domestic 
violence survivors.  Because batterers are more likely to attack their victims 
right after they leave
 267
 and recidivism rates in domestic violence cases are 
high,
268
 the receiving state is likely to be a site of further abuse that may 
require police and/or court intervention.  Victims of domestic violence are 
also often financially reliant on their abusers.
269
  When victims leave their 
abusers by moving away, victims often find themselves with no job, no 
reliable transportation, and little or no assets.
270
  In turn, this forces many 
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 See, e.g., Stoever, supra note 167, at 1081-82 (“Costs related to experiencing 
domestic violence and to ending violence are substantial. In the United States, the annual 
cost of medical care, mental health services, and time away from work due to intimate 
partner violence is estimated to be $8.3 billion (in 2003 dollars). Every year, survivors of 
intimate partner violence lose nearly 8 million days of paid work, which amounts to more 
than 32,000 full-time jobs. They also lose approximately 5.6 million days of household 
productivity due to domestic violence, and there are significant costs for services to 
children exposed to domestic violence.”) (citations omitted). 
267
 See supra note 252; Mahoney, supra note 155, at 64 (“At least half of women who 
leave their abusers are followed and harassed or further attacked by them.”).  
268
 See, e.g., Skoien, 614 F.3d at 644 (“[T]he recidivism rate [in domestic violence 
cases] is high[.] . . . Estimates of this rate come from survey research and range from 40% 
to 80%[.] . . . No matter how you slice these numbers, people convicted of domestic 
violence remain dangerous to their spouses and partners.”) (citations omitted). 
269
 See, e.g., Ralph Henry, Domestic Violence and the Failures of Welfare Reform: The 
Role for Work Leave Legislation, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 67, 68 (2005) 
270
 See, e.g., Eliza Hirst, Note, The Housing Crisis for Victims of Domestic Violence: 
Disparate Impact Claims and Other Housing Protection for Victims of Domestic Violence, 
10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 131, 133-34 (2003) (“Abusers often control the 
finances or prohibit their victims from working, which leaves many victims of domestic 
violence without any money when fleeing abusers.”); Comment, supra note 163, at 598 
(“[W]hen a woman finally gets up the courage to leave her batterer, she often has no job, 
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victims to rely on welfare and other forms of public assistance.
271
  And 
domestic violence survivors are more likely than most to struggle to obtain 
employment and get off of welfare.
272
  Even survivors who do find 
employment struggle to maintain such employment and often make their 
employer a target for harassment from the batterer.
273
  Survivors of 
domestic violence also often struggle to find suitable permanent housing 
after leaving their abusers, with many relying on public housing and many 
others becoming homeless.
274
   
 
Thus, when a batterer abuses someone with the knowledge that she will 
likely flee to another state, and she does flee there, his conduct imposes 
substantial effects and costs on that state’s economy and society.  The 
effects of battering reach well beyond the victim and are analogous to (and 
perhaps greater than) those imposed by companies who utilize a distribution 
system that targets a particular state’s economy or intentional tortfeasors 
whose conduct targets a forum as a whole.  Just as we hold these defendants 
accountable for their actions, so too should batterers be responsible for their 
                                                                                                                            
no car, no house, and no bank account.”); see also Margaret E. Johnson, Changing Course 
in the Anti-Domestic Violence Legal Movement: From Safety to Security, 60 VILL. L. REV. 
145, 148 (2015) (“[M]any women who experience domestic violence find themselves 
homeless and jobless when the dust settles.”). 
271
 See, e.g., Henry, supra note 269, at 73; Comment, supra note163, at 598.  
272
 See Henry, supra note 269, at 73 (“Further studies have provided empirical 
evidence that domestic violence can make it very difficult for a woman to successfully 
leave the welfare rolls or even to maintain part-time employment if forced off of 
welfare.”); see also Comment, supra note 163, at 601 (“Long-term abuse can produce 
depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, inability to concentrate, substance abuse 
problems, and difficulty in making decisions.”). 
273
 See Rutledge, supra note 153, at 182-87 (describing the impact of domestic 
violence on the victim’s employer). 
274
 See Shirley Darby Howell, Making Women Homeless and Keeping Them Homeless 
Domestic Violence, Flawed Interpretations of 42 U.S.C. S1437d(l)(6), Sexual Harassment 
in Public Housing, and Municipal Violations of the Eighth Amendment, 65 GUILD PRAC. 
77, 78 (2008) (“At least fifty percent of homeless women became homeless as a direct 
result of domestic abuse[.]”); Elizabeth J. Thomas, Building A Statutory Shelter for Victims 
of Domestic Violence: The United States Housing Act and Violence Against Women Act in 
Collaboration, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 289, 305 (2004) (“Victims of domestic violence 
often do not possess the financial resources necessary to obtain suitable housing; however, 
[public housing] provides these victims with a potential source of housing in their quest to 
escape a violent relationship.”); Hirst, supra note 270, at 134 (“When friends, relatives, and 
private housing do not offer viable options, federally subsidized housing may be the last 
resort for victims, short of homelessness.”); cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14043e(7) (“Victims of 
domestic violence often return to abusive partners because they cannot find long-term 
housing.”).  
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own choices and subject to jurisdiction in states where they knowingly force 
their victims to flee.
275
       
    
VI.  OBJECTIONS TO THE KNOWLEDGE TEST 
 
Professor Miles makes several arguments against relying on the effects test 
in domestic violence cases which could also be raised against utilizing the 
Knowledge Test.
276
  First, Professor Miles points out that courts have been 
reluctant to embrace the effects test in interstate domestic violence cases in 
part because jurisdiction cannot be premised “solely on emotional injury in 
the forum based on a wrongful act in another state.”277  However, as 
discussed above, when a domestic violence victim is forced to flee to 
another state, she suffers far more than a mere emotional injury in the 
destination state.  Instead, the effects are like those in Calder: 
comprehensive, ongoing, and targeted to the forum itself rather than just the 
victim. 
Second, Professor Miles argues that some long arm statutes take a narrower 
view of the effects test than might be allowed by the Due Process Clause, 
which would limit the availability of the effects test—and presumably by 
extension, the Knowledge Test—to domestic violence victims fleeing to 
those states.
278
  This critique is a valid one but it highlights a problem with 
those states’ limited long arm statutes rather than with the Knowledge Test.  
Even if states are reluctant to expand their jurisdictional statutes with 
respect to the effects test in general, nothing would stop them from enacting 
statutes that specifically provide for jurisdiction over out of state domestic 
violence perpetrators as most states have done for other specific acts 
committed by non-residents.
279
        
Third, Professor Miles argues that whether the victim’s flight to a particular 
state was foreseeable to the defendant may be “strongly contested” and 
“murky” in many cases.280  However, the issue of the defendant’s 
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 Cf. Stoever, supra note 167, at 1053-58 (describing the the “minimal length of 
protection afforded to domestic violence survivors [by domestic violence restraining 
orders], in comparison to business and property interests” being afforded permanent 
protection through injunctive relief). 
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 See Miles, supra note 35, at 164-67. 
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 Id. at 164-66 (citing Caplan, 879 N.E. at 121 n.5). 
278
 Miles, supra note 35, at 165-66. 
279
 See, e.g., Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes 
Extended to the Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV. 491, 496 (2004) (noting that 
“forty-three states . . . have long-arm statutes [that] enumerate[e] the acts that subject a 
nonresident to jurisdiction in the state.”). 
280
 Miles, supra note 35, at 166. 
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knowledge with respect to the forum would likely be easier for courts to 
determine in domestic violence cases than in stream of commerce cases 
where courts already routinely assess the defendant’s knowledge of and 
intent to target the forum.  In those cases, the defendant is usually a large 
corporation whose actions represent the sum of decisions made by dozens if 
not hundreds of different people, making concepts like “intent” and 
“knowledge” difficult to determine and highly contestable in individual 
cases.
281
  Moreover, the evidence necessary to prove intent and 
knowledge—if it exists at all—is usually entirely under the control of the 
corporate defendant and must be unearthed via extensive (and expensive) 
jurisdictional discovery.
282
  In a typical domestic violence case applying the 
Knowledge Test by contrast, the court only needs to look at the knowledge 
of one individual natural person—the defendant.  Moreover, proof of the 
defendant’s knowledge is likely to be found in the history of the parties’ 
relationship (i.e., things the plaintiff told the defendant, places they visited 
together, etc.)—evidence of which is equally available to both parties.  
Thus, although assessing the knowledge of a party is a difficult enterprise in 
any case, there is every reason to believe it would be less difficult in the 
domestic violence context than in other contexts where parties’ knowledge 
is already routinely assessed by courts.    
Finally, Professor Miles argues that defendants are less likely to comply 
with protective orders if they perceive those orders as being entered in the 
“absence of procedural justice.”283  It is almost certainly true that defendants 
are more likely to comply with orders they perceive as the result of a 
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 See Erik T. Moe, Case Comment, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: The 
Stream of Commerce Doctrine, Barely Alive but Still Kicking Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. 
Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987), 76 GEO. L.J. 203, 208 (1987) (noting that “a 
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see also Doug-Long, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 72 T.C. 158, 181 (1979) 
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Intent: Toward A Better Understanding of Corporate Misconduct, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 
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 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 190 
(1976) (“It is extraordinarily difficult to ascertain the intent of a large corporation by the 
methods of litigation. What juries (and many judges) do not understand is that the 
availability of evidence of improper intent is often a function of luck and of the defendant's 
legal sophistication, not the underlying reality.”). 
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 Miles, supra note 35, at 166-67. 
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procedurally just process.
284
  However, this argument cuts in favor of the 
Knowledge Test and against using the status exception for domestic 
violence cases.  A defendant is more likely to perceive a court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction as fair when its assertion of power turns on an examination of 
the defendant’s own knowledge and conduct rather than an arcane legal 
doctrine that simply reclassifies the matter as a status determination that 
does not involve the defendant at all.  And because the Knowledge Test is 
merely an extension of existing personal jurisdiction doctrine, the defendant 
would be getting similar treatment to defendants in other cases instead of 
being subject to a special “exception” to generally applicable due process 
protections.  Therefore, applying the Knowledge Test rather than the status 
exception in domestic violence cases will increase the likelihood that 
defendants will perceive the jurisdictional aspect of the process as fair. 
Another potential argument against the Knowledge Test that Professor 
Miles does not raise but others have is the “self-serving” problem that is 
inherent in the effects test.  The purported problem is essentially that a 
plaintiff can subject a defendant to the more relaxed personal jurisdiction 
standard of the effects test by simply asserting that the defendant has 
committed an intentional tort even if he has not in fact done so.
285
  
Whatever the merits of this objection to the effects test in general, it is a 
weak objection to the Knowledge Test because false allegations of domestic 
violence are extremely rare.
286
  Moreover, it is unlikely that a person would 
                                                 
284
 See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Calibrating Participation: Reflections On 
Procedure Versus Procedural Justice, DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 
1 & n.2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2617355  
(“[E]mpirical studies demonstrate that whether people are satisfied with process and 
perceive it as being procedurally fair significantly impact their opinion of whether courts 
are legitimate sources of power and authority, often even more so than whether they win or 
lose.”) (collecting sources). 
285
 See, e.g., Halaby, supra note 225, at 632 (arguing that the effects test “invite[s] 
personal jurisdiction determinations based on plaintiffs’ self-serving allegations of 
nefarious conduct by [the] defendant rather than through liability-neutral analyses.”); 
David Post, The “Effects Test” rises up – temporarily, one hopes – from its sickbed, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/04/14/the-effects-test-rises-up-temporarily-one-hopes-from-its-
sickbed/ (“Simply allege an unauthorized use of your trademark – that it was not used by 
accident, but via an ‘intentional’ act – and presto! you can subject the defendant to the 
personal jurisdiction of your home court[.] . . . It can’t be that easy, and it shouldn’t be that 
easy.”). 
286
 See, e.g., Nicholas Bala, Bringing Canada's Divorce Act into the New Millennium: 
Enacting A Child-Focused Parenting Law, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 425, 450 & n.65 (2015) 
(“[S]tudies that have been undertaken clearly indicate that there are substantially more false 
denials and minimizations of spousal abuse by genuine abusers (generally men) than 
exaggerations or false allegations by victims (generally women).”) (collecting sources); 
56 The Stream of Violence 10-Feb-16 
uproot her entire life to move to another state just to make a false accusation 
of domestic violence, when she could just as easily make the same false 
accusation without moving.  Instead, someone who goes to all the trouble of 
moving to another state is far more likely to have a real fear for her safety. 
Finally, it may be argued that the provision of the federal Violence Against 
Women Act requiring inter-state recognition of domestic violence 
judgments offers adequate protection to domestic violence victims fleeing 
to other states.
287
  However, as even the Fox court admitted, seeking a 
restraining order in the original state where the violence took place “may in 
some cases be logistically challenging, psychologically difficult, or even 
personally dangerous.”288  When a person is subject to domestic violence to 
such a severe degree that she is forced to leave her home and flee to another 
state, her personal safety will likely be her top priority, rather than ensuring 
that she files the paperwork to obtain a restraining order prior to leaving.  
Thus, while the inter-state judgment recognition provision of VAWA is a 
valuable tool in some circumstances,
289
 it is not a substitute for the assertion 
of personal jurisdiction where the defendant knows his violent acts may 
cause the plaintiff to flee to a particular state. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
A victim of domestic violence should not be barred access to legal 
protection simply because she was forced to seek physical protection by 
moving away from her abuser.  However, attempting to fit domestic 
violence into the status exception is not a coherent or particularly effective 
way to help solve the problem of jurisdiction in inter-state flight domestic 
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violence cases.  Instead, courts should exercise jurisdiction over batterers 
who force their victims to flee to another state where the batterer knew or 
should have known that the victim was likely to flee.  This approach 
logically follows from the principles embodied in the stream of commerce 
doctrine and the effects test and will hold batters accountable for the 
consequences of their actions in a way that is consistent with due process of 
law.   
